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ABSTRACT
Modernist science is a discourse that separates us externally from our
environment, socially from one another, and internally within ourselves. This study
not only examines the role education plays in developing our perceptions of meaning,
but it also explores the cognitive, linguistic, and cultural-historical aspects of why
humans began separating themselves from the organic processes of the natural world
over 300 years ago.
This study incorporates a two-pronged methodological approach similar to that
developed by French historian Michel Foucault. The archeological portion of the
study examines how discourses from both the sciences and arts operating during the
period surrounding the Scientific Revolution began shifting away from an earlier
medieval conceptual framework of integration with nature toward our own modernist
framework of a separation from nature.
The genealogical portion of the study examines the cultural-historical context
surrounding the Scientific Revolution and suggests four main areas of social change
that may have subtly influenced a conceptual shift toward the externalization,
depersonalization, and dichotomization of humans and the natural world. These four
areas include Humanism, Puritanism, political discussions regarding the Divine Right
of Kings, and Mystical Science.
The study then shifts focus to a discussion of how the modernist curriculum
operates as a primary form of discourse dividing us conceptually from our world
today. The study concludes by recommending three broad conceptual approaches for
expanding modernist curricular discourses. These conceptual approaches encourage
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seeing meaning more comprehensively, developing historical consciousness, and
approaching nature as a “living discourse” to be read holistically with the analytical
intellect and the synthetic imagination.
1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The woods of Arcady are dead. And over is their antique joy;
Of old the world on dreaming fed; Grey Truth is now her painted toy.
(W.B. Yeats, 1889, The Song of the Shepherd)
Modern science appears to be a discourse that perceptually divides us from our
natural world on many different levels. In his book Transformative Learning (1999)
Edmund O’Sullivan writes that:
For well over three centuries we have been, as humans, attempting to separate
ourselves from the organic processes of the natural world. With the Cartesian
turn, the mind was elevated over nature and it was the work of the human
mind to wrest secrets and powers from the natural world. By separating the
human self from a larger inclusion in nature and the universe we have
proceeded to deepen the chasm of alienation of the human from the natural
world. (O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 95)
But why, it might be asked, did humans begin separating themselves from the
organic processes of the natural world in the first place, and, more importantly, how
does this separation continue to influence our lives today? One way that modern
science appears to influence our lives is in how it fragments our perceptions and
understandings of the world in which we live. This, as Capra suggests, can especially
be seen in the way that modern science promotes a conceptual outlook that ultimately
envisions our world:
…as a mechanical system composed of elementary building blocks…the
human body as a machine…life in society as a competitive struggle for
2existence, the belief in unlimited material progress to be achieved through
economic and technological growth, and last, but not least, the belief that a
society in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male as one
that follows a basic law of nature. (Capra, 1996, p. 6)
Some writers (Quinn, 1997; Miller, 2000) have suggested that such a reductive-
mechanistic conceptual outlook encourages a perception of reality that “alienates us
spatially and psychologically from the ecosystems that sustain us” (Wackernagel &
Rees, 1996, p. 132). This conceptual “alienation” has led others to suggest that this
fragmented outlook could lead us to an even more pernicious outcome, since, as the
poet Gary Snyder explains: “a culture who alienates itself from the very ground of its
own being…is doomed to a very destructive behavior, ultimately perhaps self-
destructive behavior” (Snyder, 1989, p. 184).
Some postmodern writers (Merchant, 1992; Moore, 1992; Orr, 2001) believe that
the evidence of this “self-destructive behavior” can already be seen manifested in
many areas of our lives today. For instance, we can see it in our relationship with
our external environment, where many of our leading environmental organizations
such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the United Nations Environmental
Programme, and the Worldwatch Institute continue to warn us regarding the impact
our relationship with the environment appears to be having on our planet’s overall
ecological balance and sustainability. Thus Lester explains:
…our tropical forests are shrinking by 11 million hectares per year; 31 million
hectares in industrial countries are damaged due to acid rain and air
pollution…an estimated 26 billion tons of topsoil is lost annually…there is an
3estimated 6 million hectares of new desert formed each year…underground
water tables are falling globally…extinction of plant and animal species
together are now estimated at several thousand per year; one-fifth of all
species may disappear over the next twenty years…mean temperature is
projected to rise between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees Celsius between now and
2050…carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have increased about 30
percent from 1850 to 1980 and are projected to leap a further 75% by
2060…the upper earth’s atmosphere indicates numerous growing holes in the
ozone layer suggesting gradual global depletion could be starting and
escalating risks of skin cancer on a level never before experienced. (as cited in
O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 2)
Unfortunately, these are just a few of the serious ecological challenges currently
facing our planet today. And as controversial as these issues continue to be, many of
our modern scientists would not only agree, but many have openly expressed their
acceptance of the fact that we modern humans appear to be altering our planet’s
global ecology in ways never before thought possible. In fact, Harvard ecologist
Edward O. Wilson believes that modern humans may be responsible for unleashing
one of the single most devastating “spasm of extinction” to life on this planet since
those evidenced in the fossil record toward the end of the Paleozoic and Mesozoic
eras. He also believes that if we continue in our present abusive relationship with
our natural environment that we may soon witness a magnitude of change in our
planet’s biodiversity as never before seen or “experienced in our planet’s geological
past” (Wilson, 1992, p. 12).
4This growing prospect of such sweeping ecological changes may also explain why
1,700 of our world’s leading natural and physical scientists felt it incumbent upon
themselves to unite together for the purpose of issuing a formal “statement of
concern” regarding what they believe to be the tenuous state of our planet’s
ecological future:
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course…If not
checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we
wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter
the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we
know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our
present course will bring about. (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2003, p. 1)
Many modern ecologists and educators alike (Capra, 1996; Doll, 1996; Fleener,
2002) not only fully concur with this prognosis of impending ecological doom, but
some have even commented on the strange irony that seems connected with the
ecological collision course described above. If we truly are racing toward an ultimate
“crash” with our natural environment in the near future, it would seem that we are
doing so only because of an even deeper conceptual separation that already exists
between humans and their natural world.
In other words, it is largely due to our modernist conceptual outlook that “we are
able to abstract a world of separate objects, including a separate self, and then to
believe that those objects belong to an objective, independently existing reality”
(Capra, 1996, p. 293). It is precisely this perceived “independence” from our natural
environment that not only allows us to approach our world as a dead, inert, raw
5material to be used and exploited without regard, but unfortunately it is also what
makes the likelihood of a future “ecological crash” such a viable possibility in the
first place. As a result, the more we allow our modernist outlook to permeate our
perceptions and relationships with our natural world, the more “womb-like nature
vanishes” and, with it, “the gradual emancipation of humans from an embeddedness
in nature” (Toolan, 2001, p. 47).
Another area where I believe we can observe the self-destructive effects of our
modernist outlook working in our lives is in how it divides us socially from one
another. Once again, by conceptually reducing our natural world to the level of an
“independent existing reality,” we unfortunately encourage our social relationships to
be perceived and interpreted from a similar materialistic framework of meaning.
Instead of approaching our fellow humans from an integrated context of cooperation,
empathy, compassion, and mutual respect, our modernist conceptual outlook
encourages a social context based on such principles as competition, self-
aggrandizement, manipulation, and, of course, survival of the fittest.
Such a materialistic and reductive social framework not only diminishes the
intrinsically “human aspect” from our social interactions, but I believe it also
encourages an extreme materialistic tendency for reducing:
…our quality to quantity, our value to veneer, our interior to exterior, our
depth to surface, our dignity to disaster…our compassion to serotonin, our joy
to dopamine, our cultural values to modes of techno-economic production, our
moral wisdom to technical steering problems, and our contemplation to brain
waves. (Wilber, 1997, p. 177)
6This leads us to perhaps one of the most subtle and pernicious self-destructive
effects of all regarding our modernist scientific outlook, and that is in how it divides
us internally within our very selves. This, I believe, is especially evident when we
consider how our modernist outlook metaphysically divides the rational from the
emotional, the spiritual from the physical, and the intellectual from the imaginative.
Such an internal subdividing may do more than just mitigate our capacity for
experiencing nature as an interconnected whole. It may also be one of the primary
motivators behind many of our current feelings of detachment, isolation, loneliness,
and general despair: feelings that cultural historian Thomas Berry believes to be the
direct result of the fact that:
We cannot live within ourselves. For our inner world is a response to the
outer world. Without the wonder and majesty and beauty of the outer world
we would have no developed inner world. As all living beings around us
perish, then we perish within. In a sense we lose our souls, our imagination,
our emotional range, we even lose our intellectual development. (Berry, 1999,
p. 1)
And the more we continue to “perish within,” the more we seem to perish without.
This can be seen by the dramatic increase in modern times of such negative behaviors
as suicide, depression, mass neurosis, skepticism, hopelessness, and nihilism:
behaviors that Quinn believes to be the outward symptoms of an “amorphous,
spontaneous, and direct response of despair and surrender to the confusion of an
exclusively mechanistic, materialistic, secular worldview” (Quinn, 1995, p. 269).
7Problem Statement and Research Questions
How then are we to begin addressing the various problems associated with our
modernist scientific discourse? Capra suggests that the first step might be in realizing
that the concerns described above may not necessarily be separate problems, but
rather:
…different facets of one single problem, which is largely a crisis of
perception arising from the fact that most of us, and especially our large social
institutions, subscribe to the concepts of an outdated worldview. (Capra, 1996,
p. 3-4)
Many postmodern educators (Sterling, 2001; Orr, 1994; Berry, 1988) would agree
with Capra’s conclusion, in that, they too believe that one of the primary problems
with our modernist outlook is essentially an institutional problem in how modern
humans have learned to think and feel about their world in general. In fact, Orr
believes that our present external, social and internal crisis of perception is ultimately
the result of a “crisis of values, ideas, perspectives, and knowledge, which makes it a
crisis of education, and not one merely in education” (Orr, 1994, p.126).
Educator Stephen Sterling (2001) also believes that our current perceptual crisis is
one ultimately based in an outdated educational system that remains deeply
entrenched in “a mechanistic paradigm and overlaid by utilitarian market
philosophies” (p. 17). Moreover, he is convinced that as long as our modern
educational system continues to endorse a conceptual framework that promotes such
ideas as human dominance over the natural world, unmitigated economic
consumption, and the deification of the analytical sciences as an exclusive way of
8knowing the world, we will likewise continue to languish in our present external,
social and existential crisis of perception. Thus Orr writes:
The fact that we see things as disconnected events today or fail to see them at
all is, I believe, evidence of a considerable failure that we have yet to
acknowledge as an educational failure. It is a failure to educate people to
think broadly, to perceive systems and patterns and to live as whole persons.
(Orr, 1994, p. 2)
It would seem, then, that unless we can begin addressing how we are educated to
think and feel about our world from a conceptual point of view, it is doubtful that we
will be able to begin reconnecting our fragmented lives and begin empowering those
we teach to “fulfill their proper role in the larger pattern of meaning” (Berry, 1988, p.
256). In other words, unless we change how our world is conceptualized from an
educational perspective, it is doubtful that we will be able to establish the conceptual
foundation we need for perceiving our world less like a dead, external, raw material
to be dominated and exploited, and more like an “intimate web of communal
relationships that can be known only by being in community with it” (Palmer; 1998,
p. 95).
How then are we to begin changing our modernist scientific outlook through
education into one that encourages not only a more integrated perception of the world
from without, but also a deeper sense of unity and belongingness from within? The
goal of this study will be to explore the conceptual basis of our modernist scientific
discourse with the natural world. Specifically, it will seek to better understand why
humans began separating themselves from the organic processes of the natural world
9over 300 years ago in the first place. It will also seek to explore how such interrelated
factors as concepts, language, culture and history may have influenced a transition
from an earlier pre-modern conceptual outlook of the natural world to our own
modernist scientific outlook.
By examining these interrelated factors, not to mention their possible influence on
our perceptions of the world in general, I will endeavor to create a broader context of
meaning for not only critiquing our current “crisis of perception,” but also for
encouraging a more complex understanding as to why we perceive and approach our
world as we do today. Such a context, I believe, could afford us a new “condition of
possibility” for considering how we might begin changing our current modernist
outlook through education into one that is less fragmented and divided as a whole.
As such, this study will be guided by the following research questions:
1) Why have modern humans become so divided in their perceptions of the
world today, and what major factors may have influenced this division?
2) What are the educational implications?
Dissertation Outline
In this chapter I have briefly introduced some of the problems associated with our
modernist scientific discourse, especially regarding how this discourse as it is often
promoted through education today encourages a conceptual framework that divides
and fragments our perceptions of meaning. I also outlined the primary research
questions that this study will seek to address.
In chapter two I will develop a theoretical lens for exploring these research
questions. This chapter will primarily examine how our perceptions of meaning are
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influenced by concepts as those concepts are expressed within a linguistic framework
of discourse. It will also briefly examine how language, in the form of discourse,
might itself be influenced by such interrelated factors as culture and history.
In chapter three I will introduce and describe the methodological approach that I
will use for exploring the research questions outlined for this study. This chapter will
focus primarily on Michael Foucault’s archeological and genealogical techniques for
examining changes in discourse as they occur within a given cultural-historical
context of meaning.
In chapter four I will utilize Foucault’s archeological and genealogical techniques
to explore how various forms of social discourse may have changed and evolved
during the historical period surrounding the Scientific Revolution (1450-1630): a
period that many historians (Boaz, 1962; Lindberg, 1992) believe to mark the very
beginning of our own modernist scientific outlook. This chapter will also explore
some of the cultural-historical factors surrounding this historical period that may have
subtly, even unconsciously, influenced a transition from an earlier pre-modern
conceptual outlook to our own modernist scientific outlook.
Finally, in chapter five I will discuss the possible educational implications of this
study. This will include a brief examination of how our modernist outlook is actively
promoted and sustained through primary discourses in education today. It will also
explore how those primary discourses might be expanded into a more comprehensive
framework of meaning.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL LENS
O Lady! We receive but what we give, and in our life alone does Nature live.
(Coleridge, 1801, Dejection: an Ode)
In chapter one I briefly described how our modernist scientific discourse with
nature appears to promote a conceptual framework that divides us externally from our
environment, socially from one another, and internally within ourselves. I also
suggested that this “crisis of perception” might be an educational problem in how we
have learned to conceptualize our world from a modernist framework of meaning.
Finally, it was concluded that one possible way that we might begin encouraging a
more interconnected discourse with our natural world is through a broader
understanding of why modern humans may have become so divided in their
perceptions in the first place.
The primary focus of this chapter will be to develop a theoretical lens for exploring
the conceptual, linguistic, and cultural basis of why we have become so divided in our
perceptions of the world today. This, I believe, is important because although there
has been much written about the nature of modernist science (Kuhn, 1962; Bateson,
1972; Bortoft, 1996), as well as many critiques of modernist science from a
postmodern perspective (Fleener, 2002; Capra, 1996; Merchant, 1996), less has been
done regarding the factors that may have actually influenced the transition from a pre-
modern to modernist conceptualization of the natural world. Such an understanding
is important because of its unique potential for helping us to not only develop a more
complex understanding as to why we have become so divided in our perceptions
today, but also for helping us consider how we might begin reconnecting ourselves
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perceptually back to our world before it is ecologically, socially and existentially too
late.
As such, this chapter will explore the role that concepts, language, culture and
history play in structuring our knowledge and influencing our perceptions of
meaning. In developing this theoretical lens, I will specifically explore the
relationship that appears to exist between our perceptions of meaning and our own
cognitive participation in the process of knowing. This chapter will also briefly
examine the relationship that exists between concepts and perceptions of meaning as
those concepts are developed and expressed within a linguistic framework of
discourse. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief examination of the
relationship that appears to exist between language and the unique cultural-historical
context that ultimately influences its development as a form of discourse.
Perceptions and Meaning
According to the philosophy of empiricism there is an intrinsic division between
our conscious minds and the physical world of which those minds are conscious.
This philosophy assumes that our individual sense organs function as a kind of nexus
or bridge that connects our internal minds with the external world of objective reality.
As such, empirical discourses maintain that any true or valid knowledge of the world
must begin with our sensory experiences, since it is primarily through those
experiences that we are able to become aware of the external reality that is assumed
to already exist outside and apart from our sensory perceptions.
The origins of this empirical perspective can be seen perhaps most clearly in the
writings of the French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596-1650). According to
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Descartes, only reason could be trusted as a reliable guide for discerning any true and
lasting knowledge of the world. This assumption eventually led Descartes to begin
doubting the credibility of his own sensory experiences, including his ability for
distinguishing between what he thought to be “real” and what might only be a dream
or illusion created within his own mind. This led Descartes to eventually begin
questioning the epistemological basis for his knowledge of the world, not to mention
the rational grounds for supposing that an external reality existed at all, including the
external world he perceived in the form of his own physical body.
Eventually Descartes resolved this deadlock of skepticism by reaching a point that
he describes as a feeling of “I think therefore I am.” In other words, in the brute act
of thinking itself, Descartes began to identify himself as a rational, thinking being:
one that seemed to be distinct and separated from the phenomenal world that
appeared to exist outside and apart from his own rational mind. Therefore, by
doubting the fundamental basis of all reality, Descartes eventually began to conclude
that only one thing could be known to exist with certainty, and that was the existence
of his own rational ability for doubting and questioning the validity of reality. So
what began in Descartes’ skepticism regarding the existence of an externalized world
of objectified matter eventually became the epistemological foundation for his
assurance regarding the reality of a divided, self-contained, and independent world of
the rational mind. Thus writes Descartes:
From reason I knew that I was a substance, the whole essence or nature of
which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor
does it depend on any material thing; so that this “me” that is to say, the soul
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by which I am what I am is entirely distinct from body and even more easy to
know than is the latter…I am a thinking thing…and although the things which
I perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in
themselves, I am nevertheless assured that those modes of consciousness
which I call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as they are modes of
consciousness, exist in me. (as cited in Damasio, 1996, p. 249)
This proposed independence of the mind from “any material thing” eventually led
Descartes to construct a metaphysical division between the un-extended world of the
non-spatial mind and the extended world of the spatial physical body. This
metaphysical division between the extended and the un-extended, between the spatial
and the non-spatial, and between the rational and sensory ultimately led to the now
famous Cartesian dualism between mind and body.
But what this Cartesian separation of mind and body fails to acknowledge is that
every empirical observation also presupposes a certain conceptual stance on the part
of the observer. And although our knowledge of the world may certainly begin with
our sensory perceptions, it does not necessarily follow that our knowledge of the
world is tantamount to those sensory perceptions. That is because we do not perceive
our world with our sense organs alone, but rather with our entire intellectual,
emotional and spiritual beings, including our mental habits, personal biases,
imagination, and, of course, our memory of past events.
A simple example of this can be demonstrated through the visual puzzles and
optical illusions often used in the field of Gestalt psychology. For instance, many of
us have witnessed how two people can observe the exact same image of a cube, and
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yet one person will perceive it as a cube from below and the other as a cube from
above. Moreover, when two people look at the exact same image on a card, one
person will perceive an older lady and the other a young woman.
In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), cultural historian
Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) describes this same sort of “gestalt shift” when he
suggests how scientists working under different conceptual frameworks, or
paradigms, will actually perceive the same natural phenomena in very different ways:
…the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different
worlds… the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from
the same point in the same direction. Again, that is not to say that they can
see anything they please. Both are looking at the world, and what they look at
has not changed. But in some areas they see different things, and they see
them in different relations one to the other. (p. 150)
This perceptual difference appears to be less about the content of what is actually
seen by the individual percipients, and more the result of each percipient’s own
peculiar way of seeing. In other words, each of the observers in the examples above
experienced the same set of sensory stimuli on their physical sense organs, and yet
those same sensory stimuli appear to have produced very different perceptions of
meaning. It would appear, then, that there is more to our seeing than merely meets
the eye of our sensory perception.
Perhaps one of the first modern philosophers to begin addressing the anomaly
described above was Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677). Spinoza challenged the Cartesian
dualism between mind and body by showing that if two substances are divided in
16
their “spatial orientation,” there could be no common ground or “space” in which
they could meet for the purpose of interaction. Since, according to Spinoza, “of two
substances which have nothing in common between them, one cannot be said to be
the cause of the other” (Spinoza, 1952, Prop. III). Simply stated, if the mind was not
an “extended” material substance, Spinoza could not see how it could possibly have
any relationship whatsoever to the physical body. And if the physical body was
strictly prohibited from any participation in the “unextended” realm of the mind,
Spinoza could not understand how there could be any kind of mutual influence
between the two.
As a result, Spinoza was convinced that the mind and body were not a division of
substances as Descartes had presumed, but rather an integrated unity of substances;
like two threads coming together to make one cloth:
The body is the object of the mind… And the object of the idea constituting
the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing
and nothing else… and we have ideas of the affections of a body; therefore,
the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body and that too
actually existing. (Spinoza, 1952, Prop. III)
As a result, Spinoza believed that the mind and the body not only worked together
in forming our perceptions of reality, but that each actually came together as a single
unity in the dynamic process of thinking itself. That is because without the mind we
could not “know” of the body’s existence, since the body can be known only insofar
as it is represented as an actual idea within our conscious minds. And without the
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various sensations provided by our physical bodies, there would simply be nothing
for our minds to be “conscious of.” Damasio expresses a similar belief when writing:
...body and mind are manifestations of a single organism. Although we can
dissect them under the microscope, for scientific purposes they are in effect
inseparable under normal operating circumstances. (Damasio, 2003, p. 223)
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) also described the unifying
relationship that appears to exist between our conscious minds and the physical world
of which those minds are conscious. Like Spinoza, Kant did not believe that our
knowledge of the world was merely the sum total of our sensory perceptions. Rather,
he believed that all meaning was the result of an intimate synthesis between our
sensory perceptions and how those perceptions are cognitively structured and
organized into a particular figuration of meaning, or “form of knowledge,” as Gaarder
describes:
Kant agreed with Hume and the empiricists that all our knowledge of the
world comes from sensations. But, and here Kant stretches his hand out to the
rationalists, in our reason there are also decisive factors that determine how
we perceive the world around us. (Gaarder, 1996, p. 325)
Kant was therefore convinced that how we perceive and what we perceive was an
inseparable unity. In other words, the meanings we actually perceive in the form of a
phenomenal world was for Kant less like a transmission of information from the
physical to the mental, and much more like a complex dance between “things as they
exist-in-themselves” (Kant’s noumena), and things as they are ultimately organized,
figured and represented into different forms of knowledge by our own cognitive
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participation (Kant’s phenomena). As a result, Kant believed that there was basically
one world. However, the categories of thought that ultimately structured the
appearances of that world into a particular perception of meaning, he believed, varied
not only between different individuals, but between entire cultures as well.
So instead of assuming like the empiricists that our knowledge of the world was
but a mere reflection of a pre-given external reality independent and divided from our
cognitive involvement in the process of knowing, Kant believed that our world could
be known and understood in a meaningful way only insofar as it first conformed to
the cognitive structures of our own individual “knowing minds:”
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions
without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our
concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our
intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers
or capacities cannot exchange their functions; the understanding can intuit
nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can
knowledge arise. (Kant, 1964, B 79)
The German poet and philosopher Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) also
recognized the inseparable unity that appears to exist between our sensory
perceptions and our cognitive participation in organizing those perceptions into a
particular expression of meaning. For Goethe, the manifestation of the phenomenal
world was not something independent of the individual observer, but rather was
“caught up and entangled in the observer’s own individuality” (as cited in Naydler,
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1996, p. 72). Goethe was therefore convinced that the actual “meanings” we perceive
in the form of the phenomenal world required not only sensory inputs from the
external world, but also the active involvement of our own conscious minds in the
process of organizing those sensory inputs into a particular “mode of illumination” or
Vorstellungsart” (as cited in Steiner, 1950, p. 48).
Goethe also believed that it was possible for different conceptual “modes of
illumination” to produce entirely different ways of experiencing the world, not to
mention theorizing and practicing science in the world. In short, what Goethe
recognized was that what we perceive is not necessarily the fixed, immutable objects
of a pre-given external world, but rather sensations that have been cognitively
structured and organized into expressed “meanings.”
This belief directly challenges many of the underlying assumptions of the
philosophy of empiricism, which holds that insofar as our thinking and perceiving are
regarded as separate events, the process of “empirical observation” becomes more or
less the absolute arbiter of our knowledge of the world. But if our empirical
observations are themselves influenced and adjudicated by an inextricable conceptual
element in our cognitive processes, then those observations can no longer be regarded
as having any kind of absolute authority.
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was another modern philosopher who believed that
“what we experience” (the nomatic) and the “way we experience” (the noetic) were
not two separate events, but rather different aspects of the same unified process of
cognition. As such, Husserl believed that no meaning could be conceived apart from
the act of conceiving, nor could there be any acts of conceiving that could exist apart
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from something in which to conceive. Cerbone alludes to this cognitive unity when
describing Husserl’s phenomenological approach:
Noetic description describes acts of consciousness, but in so doing will make
reference to objects of consciousness…nomatic description describes the
objects of consciousness, but in so doing will make reference to acts of
consciousness. (as cited in Prado, 2003, p. 49)
Therefore, like Spinoza, Kant and Goethe before him, Husserl emphasized the
indivisible link that appears to exist between our conscious minds and the
phenomenal world of which those minds are conscious. But as Husserl explains, it is
because our minds are continually engaged in the act of organizing sensations into
perceptions of meaning that their involvement in the process tends to become
obscured. As a result, we forget our cognitive participation in the process of knowing
the world because it is only through this cognitive participation that we are able to
perceive things in a meaningful way in the first place.
This failure to remember our own cognitive participation in knowing the world;
something Bortoft (1996) refers to as “cognitive amnesia,” unfortunately leads us to
the erroneous belief that what we perceive through our sensory experiences is in fact
just a transmitted copy of an independent, pre-given world of meaning that already
exists outside and apart from any involvement on our part as the knowing percipients.
Which of course, is what many empiricists do believe and have believed ever since
the time of Descartes. For as Doll explains, “this categorical separation between the
external and the personal…is part of Descartes’ legacy to modernism (Doll, 1993, p.
31).
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Finally, the cognitive scientists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela extend
the idea of our cognitive participation into perhaps its most comprehensive
framework of all; one involving our language, emotions, intellect, imagination and
willed actions. As such, it is under their Santiago Theory of cognition that the mind
is no longer seen as a mere divided spectator in the process of our knowing, but rather
becomes an involved participant in the twofold process of “living and knowing.”
Hence it is under this theory that the body in the form of the brain becomes the
physical structure through which the process of mind operates, thus forming the very
nexus through which living things cognitively “couple” with their physical
environment for the purpose of “bringing forth” a phenomenal world of meaning:
Cognition, then, is not a representation of an independently existing world, but
rather a continual bringing forth of a world through the process of living. The
interactions of a living system with its environment are cognitive interactions,
and the process of living itself is a process of cognition. (Capra, 1996, p. 266)
Under the Santiago Theory, then, it is only within the dynamic processes of living
itselfin change and permanence, in autonomy and openness, in ebb and flowthat
our knowing freely participates in our living and our living becomes fulfilled in our
knowing. This would explain Mautrauna’s comments that “to live is to know” (as
cited in Capra, 1996, p.174), since it is only as we live, and move, and have our being
that we can ever really hope to understand our world, our neighbors, or even
ourselves in a meaningful way.
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Meaning and Language
I have described how the philosophy of empiricism assumes that our knowledge of
the world is derived directly from our sensory experiences and that the meanings we
“discover” from those experiences are themselves already present “ready made,” so to
speak, in the world before we actually perceive them. However, I also suggested that
what this empirical framework fails to acknowledge is the cognitive role our minds
appear to play in organizing our sensory inputs into actual perceptions of meaning.
The main purpose of this section will be to explore the role that concepts play, as they
are expressed through language, in organizing our perceptions into meanings.
This is important since the empirical perspective also assumes that after objective
meanings have been directly apprehended by the senses, they are arranged and
organized into the basic “concepts of meaning” that are ultimately transmitted and
expressed through the various forms of discourse used to describe our world. In other
words, instead of seeing concepts as coming before our perceptions, and therefore
serving an essential cognitive role in structuring and organizing our perceptions into a
particular expression of meaning, the philosophy of empiricism sees concepts as
coming after our perceptions. But the question becomes, how can concepts be
derived from our perceptions of meaning when it appears that it is largely by means
of these concepts that we are able to organize and “bring forth” a phenomenal world
of meaning in the first place?
Austrian philosopher and mathematician Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was
perhaps one of the first modern philosophers to begin addressing this dilemma. He
did so by showing the intimate relationship that appears to exist between our
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perceptions of meaning and language. Like many of the philosophers already
mentioned above, Wittgenstein did not believe that meaning was something intrinsic
to the natural world apart from a knowing percipient. Rather, Wittgenstein was
convinced that meaning could exist and develop only within a framework of language
since, in his view, all thought was but a flow of linguistic associations made possible
as we “operate with words” (as cited in Fleener, 2002, p.131). The German
psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) communicated a similar belief when
writing:
Human speech and human thought are everywhere coincident. The
development of human consciousness includes in itself the development of
modes of expression. Language then is an essential element of the function of
thinking. (as cited in Barfield, 1967, p. 86)
According to Wittgenstein, then, the production of meaning was an intimate
“structure of relationships revealed through the language we use” (Fleener, 2002,
p.134). He was also convinced that it was only within a context of language that our
thoughts, feelings and ideas about our world could be understood and expressed in a
meaningful way; something Gadamer recognized when concluding that “being that
can be understood is language” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 474). Wittgenstein was
convinced that the kind of “being” that can be understood as a legitimate perception
of meaning was largely dependent upon the kinds of “language games” we played in
describing and expressing our world through discourse. It is through these language
games that Wittgenstein believed our world is ultimately conceptualized into a
particular framework of meaning. This would explain Wittgenstien’s comment that,
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“the limits of language mean the limits of my world” (as cited in Fleener, 2002, p
135). So instead of concepts giving meaning to language, Wittgenstein was
convinced that it was actually language that gave meaning to concepts, as Bortoft
explains:
It is recognized now that it is language which gives us concepts. The origin of
concepts is in the dawning of language, and we would never acquire concepts
if language did not dawn in us…So the commonsense view that we see and
know something before we apply words to it, which are therefore merely
labels clearly does not take into account the role of language in giving the
concept which enables us to see and know something as something in the first
place. (Bortoft, 1996, p. 311)
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) also recognized the
intimate relationship that appears to exist between concepts, language, and our
perceptions of meaning. Simply stated, Heidegger believed that there was an
inextricable link between the concepts that one could “say” through language, and the
meanings that one could actually “show” and “see” perceptually. This would explain
Heidegger’s comment that “the essential being of language is Saying as Showing”
(Heidegger, 1971, p.127), since it is ultimately through language that different modes
of reality can be conceptually “shown” and revealed to us. Or as Gadamer would say,
“reality does not happen behind the back of language; reality happens only within
language” (Gadamer, 1976, p. 35).
As a result, Heidegger believed that the concepts shown to us through language not
only structure and organize our perceptions of the world into a particular expression
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of meaning, but also that these same concepts are themselves constituted and revealed
only within a linguistic framework of discourse:
Language is the house of Being; in its home man dwells. Those who think
and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their
guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring
the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through their
speech. (Heidegger, 1993, p. 217)
Another way that language appears to influence our perceptions of meaning is
through the dynamic use of metaphor. In his Defense of Poetry (1819) the English
poet Percy Shelley (1792-1822) describes metaphors as having the unique ability for
showing us “before unapprehended relations between things” (Shelley, 1996, p 322).
In his book Poetic Diction, Barfield also describes how metaphors can “expand our
consciousness of meaning” by suggesting relationships between things that our
analytical intellects have since divided and fragmented into isolation. As such,
metaphors can show us a larger and fuller world of meaning by helping us to
reconnect through the imagination what the intellect has disconnected through
discursive reasoning:
…in the development of our modern consciousness, we have lost the power to
see unity. Our sophistication, like Odin’s, has cost us an eye: and now it is the
language of poets, insofar as they create true metaphors, which can restore
this unity conceptually after it has been lost perceptually. (Barfield, 1973, p.
86-87)
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It would seem then that metaphors represent a kind of linguistic bridge between our
synthetic imaginations and analytical intellects. It is therefore through metaphor that
new relationships of meaning can be realized and that “poetry,” as Novalis (1772-
1801) writes, can begin healing “the wounds inflicted by reason” (Novalis, 1997, p.
12). By helping us to reconnect through the imagination what has been divided and
fragmented by the intellect, metaphors can actually help to enhance our figuration of
meaning. This would explain Doll’s comments that “metaphors are open, heuristic,
dialogue-engendering…and it is through the interplay of metaphor and logic that life
is lived, experienced, and developed” (Doll, 1993, p. 168).
Finally, Maturana and Varela’s Santiago Theory of cognition also describes how
all living things, especially humans, utilize a “semantic domain” of language as a
primary means for organizing their world into a context of meaning:
According to Mautrana, the uniqueness of being human lies in our ability to
continually weave the linguistic network in which we are embedded. To be
human is to exist in language. In language we coordinate our behavior, and
together in language we bring forth our world. (Capra, 1996, p. 290)
By representing the source of our concepts, language becomes the very dawning of
our perceptions of meaning, since to live in a world of things means to first live in a
world of words. That is because “it is ultimately language and the concepts it
provides that structures our inner and outer worlds into objects, phenomena, and
meanings” (Kuhlewind, 1992, p. 30). Thus Barfield concludes:
For the most elementary distinctions of form and color are only apprehended
by us with the help of the concepts which we have come to unite with the pure
27
sense-datum. And these concepts we acquire and fix, as we grow up, with the
help of words. On the basis of past perceptions, using language as a kind of
storehouse, we gradually build up our ideas, and it is only these, which enable
us to become conscious as human beings, of the world around us. (Barfield,
1973, pp. 56-57)
Language and Culture
A final aspect of our perceptions of meaning that needs to be considered is their
unique relationship to the cultural-historical context in which they are ultimately
constituted. A good example of this can once again be seen in the writings of
Wittgenstein, who believed that it was only within a social-cultural framework, or
“form of life,” that a particular language game could acquire a context of meaning.
That is because Wittgenstien believed that all language required agreement, “not only
in definitions but also in judgments” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 242). For Wittgenstein,
these definitions and judgments could only be determined and negotiated within a
social domain:
According to the later Wittgenstein, the meaning of words could not be found
by looking for their association with particular objects. Instead, the meaning
of words should be understood by the way in which they are used within their
social context. (Trigg, 1999, p.151)
French philosopher and historian Michael Foucault (1961-1984) also recognized
the important role that a social-cultural context plays in structuring the kinds of
meanings that a particular language game or “form of discourse” could ultimately
express. However, Foucault believed that these social forces actually extended to
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include both cultural and historical influences. As such, Foucault was convinced that
all knowledge, regardless of its form, was culturally and historically constituted
through discourse. He also believed that the conceptual framework that ultimately
organized sensations into perceptions of meaning did not necessarily arise
intrinsically from within the conceptual framework itself, but rather emerged out of a
complex network of cultural-historical influences. This implies that the emergence
and development of a given conceptual framework of meaning is based less on
empirical proof and more “on choices and decisions which are essentially cultural and
historical” (Bortoft, 1996, p. 189).
This would explain why Foucault believed that a careful critique of the various
forms of discourse operating during a particular historical period could reveal the
underlying conceptual domains that actually made a particular perception of meaning
possible in the first place. Foucault was convinced that it was precisely at this
cultural-historical level that the fundamental concepts that “unobtrusively govern”
how we think and feel about our world function at their most subtle and pervasive
levels of influence. As Barfield explains:
It is obvious that the outlook of every individual will be slightly different from
that of every other, also that there will be great difference between the average
outlook of broad contemporary classes, such, for instance, as learned and
ignorant, artist and scientist, agnostic and Roman Catholic. The widest gulf of
all is likely to be that between the average outlooks of different historical
periods, and this will be increased if we are dealing with different races; such
as, for example, ancient Egyptians and modern Americans; for in this case the
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dissimilarity will extend over nearly every experience of which the human
outlook is composed. (Barfield, 1967, p. 87)
Thomas Kuhn also recognized the cultural-historical aspects of our knowledge of
the world when he described the role that paradigms play in shaping our perceptions
of meaning. For Kuhn, paradigms represented more than just formalized bodies of
information about the world; they were the very conceptual boundaries of a culture’s
mode of thinking, feeling, and ultimately discoursing about their world. Kuhn was
convinced that paradigms not only influenced what kind of scientific questions could
be legitimately asked, but also what sorts of answers would be ultimately accepted as
appropriate, cogent, or even possible at all. As Kuhn explains:
No part of the aim of a paradigm is to call forth new sorts of phenomena;
indeed those that will not fit are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists
normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those
invented by others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to the
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already
supplies. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 24)
Paradigms then, represent “our fly-bottle; our trap; the limits of what we can see”
(Fleener, 2002, p.136). They are the conceptual boundaries that limit the sort of
individuals we are willing to become as well as kinds of realities that we are willing
to accept as a legitimate “condition of possibility.” But, like Foucault, Kuhn did not
believe that the presuppositions of a particular paradigmatic perspective could
conceptually produce itself by its own intrinsic “normal scientific” methodology. In
other words, both believed that the epistemological assumptions that ultimately
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influenced a paradigms conceptual context were themselves deeply influenced by a
host of subtle, random, and even unconscious cultural-historical factors that Hubner
(1983) referred to as the “spontaneous acts” of history (p. 114). Thus concludes
Kuhn:
An apparently arbitrary element compounded of personal and historical
accident is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given
scientific community at any given time. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 4)
In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter has been to develop a theoretical lens for
exploring why modern humans have become so divided in their perceptions of the
world, as well as some of the factors that may have influenced this division in the first
place. The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that our modern discourse of
empiricism is a discourse that divides us in our perceptions of the world by denying
or obscuring our cognitive participation in structuring and organizing our sensory
perceptions into a particular expression of meaning. The literature also suggests that
our perceptions of meaning are themselves deeply influenced by the different kinds of
concepts implied through the various forms of discourse we use to describe and
express our world. The literature also indicates that these same discourses are
themselves strongly influenced by the unique cultural-historical context in which they
operate as a “language game” of meaning. In the next chapter I will briefly identify,
describe and justify the methodological approach that I will use in exploring the
research questions outlined in chapter one.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
To the extent that conceptual domains have been constructed through a work of
thought, thought could reveal their contingency and fragility, and hence the
possibility of their transformation.
(Foucault, 1994, So Is It Important To Think?)
In chapter one I briefly described some of the various problems associated with our
modernist scientific outlook and outlined the basic research questions that this study
will attempt to address. In chapter two I developed a theoretical lens for exploring
not only why modern humans have become so fragmented in their perceptions of
meaning, but also for considering some of the major factors that may have influenced
a transition from a pre-modern to modern conceptual outlook. This lens was
constructed from a body of literature suggesting an interrelationship between our
perceptions of meaning and concepts, between concepts and language, and between
language and the unique cultural-historical context in which it operates as a form of
discourse.
The main focus of this chapter will be to briefly identify, describe and justify the
methodological approach that I will use in exploring the research questions outlined
in chapter one. These questions include: (1) why have modern humans become so
divided in their perceptions of the world and what are some of the major factors that
may have influenced this division? (2) what are the educational implications?
Identification of Methodology
There are many different approaches that one could pursue in exploring these
questions. However, one possible approach might be seen in the writings of the
English poet William Wordsworth (1770-1850) who once commented that any lasting
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change in our understanding of the world could never be fully accomplished without
first:
…pointing out in what manner language and the human mind act and react on
each other, and without retracing the revolutions, not of literature alone, but
likewise of society itself. (Wordsworth, 1996, p. ii)
The primary goal of this study is to examine how the forces of language, culture
and history may have influenced the emergence of our own modernist conceptual
outlook. Toward this endeavor, I will incorporate an approach similar to the
Historical Analytical methodology developed by French philosopher and historian
Michael Foucault. This methodological approach, I believe, is conducive to this
study mainly because of its unique ability for accentuating the complex role that
history, culture and language play in shaping our knowledge and perceptions of the
world. It is therefore an approach:
…whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became
possible; within what space of order knowledge is constituted; on the basis of
what historical a priori and in the element of what positivity, ideas could
appear, science be established, experiences be reflected in philosophies, and
rationalities be formed. (Foucault, 1970, p. xxii)
Foucault’s approach is primarily an attempt to examine and describe the various
linguistic and cultural-historical conditions that influence the emergence and
subsequent development of a particular conceptual outlook or “knowledge of the
world.” By examining the primary forms of discourse operating within a given
cultural-historical context, Foucault’s method attempts to understand how the
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conceptual themes suggested through these discourses may subtly govern and
“discipline” how a particular society thinks and feels about the world in general.
It is therefore an approach that emphasizes the contingent and contextual nature of
our beliefs and assumptions about the world, including the subjective, accidental, and
even unconscious manner by which many of our beliefs emerge and develop into an
accepted body of knowledge. Such an approach, I believe, is important to this study
since it can provide us with a unique opportunity for letting history and language
become “a gateway by which meanings derived from the past can find their way into
the present [thus encouraging] a conscious adjustment of both new and old” (Dewey,
1980, p. 272). As Foucault explains:
There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think
differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is
absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. (Foucault,
1985, p. 8)
By carefully examining how a particular conceptual outlook has developed as a
function of discourse, culture and history, I believe Foucault’s Historical Analytical
approach can help us better understand when and how our modernist scientific
discourse began to emerge and evolve within a specific intellectual tradition as well
as why it began emerging as it did in the first place. I believe this sort of
understanding is essential if we are ever to begin resisting:
…the progressive degeneration which so often accompanies the acceptance of
scientific positions; a degeneration which moves first to the level where the
position is accepted uncritically, then to a level where it is thought to be
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somehow self-evident, ending finally in a stage where all questionability has
disappeared completely. In this way historical awareness possesses a critical
function. Over and over it tracks down origins that have only contingent
meanings, and thus lack necessity or compelling grounds. And it is precisely
for this reason that historical consciousness can reject such positions. (Hubner,
1983, p. 48)
Description of Methodology
As described above, Foucault’s Historical Analytical approach begins with a
careful examination of the primary literature productions for a specific historical
period. The focus of this linguistic examination begins with an attempt to identify
what Foucault describes as the “proliferation of discontinuities” in the normal flow of
discourse. This is because Foucault believed that it was precisely at these “rupture
points” or “breaks” in the smooth flow of discourse that one could begin observing
the underlying conceptual limits or “rules of formation” that unobtrusively govern
how a particular intellectual tradition understands and perceives its world in a
meaningful way.
In other words, as long as we remain embedded within a particular linguistic
framework, our ability to analyze how that framework actually influences our beliefs
and assumptions about the world is impaired. We cannot evaluate its impact on our
perceptions of meaning as long as we remain embedded within the linguistic
tradition. But once the regularity of that discourse has been broken and its normal
flow has shifted toward a new linguistic formation, we now have something to
compare our original discourse against. In that comparison we can begin seeing,
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perhaps for the first time, how deep and subtle a role that original discourse played in
“disciplining” our perceptions of reality. In short, by examining the discontinuities of
discourse, Foucault believed one could begin revealing the conceptual boundaries that
ultimately constrain and limit how we perceive and understand our world:
Beneath the great continuities of thought, beneath the solid, homogenous
manifestations of a single mind or of a collective mentality, beneath the
stubborn development of a science striving to exist and to reach completion at
the very outset…one is now trying to detect the incidence of interruptions.
Interruptions whose status and nature vary considerably…they suspend the
continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, and
force it to enter a new time…they direct historical analysis away from the
search for silent beginnings, and the never-ending tracing back to the original
precursors, towards the search for a new type of rationality and its various
affects. (Foucault, 1972, p. 4)
This may also explain why Foucault referred to this aspect of his methodology as a
kind of archeology, in that its primary purpose as a research technique was to
“uncover” and “exhume” the conceptual boundaries buried within a particular
formation of discourse. It is therefore an approach that seeks to understand not
merely what was consciously said and recorded at a given place and time in history,
but rather why something may have been unconsciously thought in the first place. By
identifying the historical shifts in the production of discourse and analyzing those
shifts with an eye toward understanding the conceptual boundaries that
“unobtrusively” influence our perceptions of reality, Foucault’s Historical Analytical
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approach is a methodology that seeks to identify how different “types of rationality”
as expressed through discourse define and limit how we think and feel about our
world in a meaningful way.
Another feature of Foucault’s Historical Analytical approach is its genealogy.
Foucault’s genealogy compliments his archeology in that it endeavors to describe and
explain what his archeology merely uncovers. As his archeology attempts to uncover
the underlying rules of formation and conceptual boundaries that govern the
production of a particular mode of discourse, Foucault’s genealogy strives to reveal
how various cultural movements of thought unconsciously influence a discourse to
break from its linguistic origins and begin developing in another direction.
Where Foucault’s archeology seeks to identify an underlying conceptual
framework or episteme buried within a particular form of discourse, his genealogy
explains why a new form of discourse, and with it a new epistemological outlook,
began emerging in the first place. Archeology therefore digs into language to
uncover a change in rationality, whereas genealogy explores the various revolutions
and “movements of thought” within a cultural-historical context and, in turn, reveals a
subtle network of dynamic social interactions. As such, Foucault’s genealogy
endeavors to understand:
…the older forms of intellectual discourse and systems of knowledge and
their related products of power without looking for causality or regulating
principles. Thus, Foucault’s genealogy does not pretend to search for
essences behind historical developments or to demonstrate continuity or
evolutionary progress. It does, instead, search out re-descriptions of past
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events and forms of discourse, without asking which ones are right and
without claiming to find a new essence of things. The point is to offer other
possible explanations or scenarios that include the obscure or forgotten events,
so that a more complex, a more relative reality can be brought forth. (Prado,
2000, p. 2)
Justification of Methodology
If in fact the evolution of human consciousness carries within itself the
development of certain modes for expressing that consciousness, then language
becomes an essential element to the function of our thinking:
We think by means of words, and we have to use the same ones for so many
different thoughts that, as soon as new meanings have entered into one set,
they creep into all our theories and begin to mould our whole cosmos; and
from theories they pass into more words, and so into our lives and institutions.
(Barfield, 1973, p. 189)
The primary purpose of this study is to explore how language, culture and history
may have interacted to influence how we think and feel about our world today.
Specifically it will examine how changes in discourse may have created a new
“condition of possibility” for a transition from a pre-modern to modern conceptual
outlook of the natural world. In addressing the first research question of this study, I
will use Foucault’s archeological and genealogical approaches in an attempt to
examine some of the various factors that may have influenced why humans began
separating themselves from the organic processes of their natural world over three
centuries ago.
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The archeological portion of this examination will explore samples from the
primary literary productions operating just before and after the historical period
known as the Scientific Revolution (1450-1630). Literary samples will be selected
based upon past experience with the discourses of the period and their perceived
overall appropriateness for capturing the “true spirit” of the conceptual outlook of the
periods in question. This archeological examination will also seek to include samples
of discourses from both the sciences and the arts. The inclusion of discourses from
the arts, I believe to be especially important since, as Elliott Eisner points out, the arts
can provide us with an emphatic understanding of the human condition that cannot be
adequately communicated through more scientific or didactic means:
Different forms of representations provide different kinds of meaning. What
one is able to convey about a society through a literal ore quantitative form of
sociology is not the same as what is sayable through a novel…What all of the
arts have in common is their capacity to generate emotion, to stimulate and to
express the “feel” of a situation, individual, or object…Feeling is a part of all
humans encounters and all situations and objects. When the feeling tone is
incongruous with the content described, understanding is diminished (Eisner,
1991, p. 552, 554).
The primary purpose of this archeological examination will be to identify some of
the possible “proliferation of discontinuities” in the primary forms of discourses
operating during the period surrounding the Scientific Revolution. This examination
will also include a discussion of how possible disruptions in the smooth flow of
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discourse may have encouraged a conceptual shift toward our own modernist outlook
of division and separation from nature.
Once I have investigated these potential changes in the smooth flow of discourse, I
will use Foucault’s genealogical approach to explore the cultural context surrounding
the Scientific Revolution. The primary goal of this exploration will be to identify and
describe how certain movements of thought during this period may have
unobtrusively, accidentally, or even unconsciously influenced a shift in discourse
toward our own modernist discourse of separation and division. This information
will then be used to create a broader context for understanding the basis of our own
fragmented conceptual outlook and to help us consider how to change that outlook
through education toward a more interconnected whole.
In this chapter I briefly identified and described Michael Foucault’s Historical
Analytical approach. I also provided a justification for using this methodology to
explore how language, cultural and history may have influenced a transition from a
pre-modern to a modern mode of conceptualizing our natural world. In the next
chapter I will use this methodological approach to identify and describe how certain
cultural historical forces operating during the 16th century may have influenced a shift
in discourse, and with it, our perceptions of the natural world in general.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
Worlds on worlds are rolling ever, from creation to decay,
Like the bubbles on a river, sparkling, bursting, borne away.
(Shelley, 1821, Hellas)
In chapter one I briefly described how our modernist scientific discourse
perceptually divides us externally from our environment, socially from one another
and internally within ourselves. I also suggested that this perceptual division might
be related to how modern humans have learned to conceptualize our world through
education today. Finally, it was proposed that a better understanding of some of the
factors that may have influenced the development of our modernist scientific
discourse could help us not only better understand why we perceive our world as we
do, but also how we might begin changing that perception through education.
In chapter two I introduced a theoretical lens for considering the linguistic,
conceptual and cultural implications regarding how we perceive and understand our
world in a meaningful way. This theoretical lens was based on the general
assumption that our perceptions of meaning are influenced by concepts, and that these
same concepts are themselves influenced by such interconnected factors as language,
culture and history.
The primary focus of this chapter will be to explore why we have become so
divided in our perceptions of the world and to examine some of the major factors that
may have influenced this perceptual division in the first place. The first section of the
chapter will consist of an archeological examination of discourse. This will involve a
comparison of the some of the underlying concepts and epistemological themes
embodied within a wide variety of discourses from the sciences and arts as they were
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operating just before and after the historical period surrounding the Scientific
Revolution. This examination will conclude with a discussion regarding how changes
in discourse may have influenced the development of our own modernist mode of
perceiving and understanding the world.
The second section of this chapter will consist of a genealogical examination of the
cultural context surrounding the Scientific Revolution. The purpose of this
examination will be to explore how certain “movements of thought” operating within
the cultural context during this period may have subtly, even unconsciously, created a
new “condition of possibility” for a shift in discourse toward our own modernist
scientific discourse of separation and division.
Archeology
Those who wish to succeed must ask the right preliminary questions.
(Aristotle, 323 BC, Metaphysics)
Why have we become so divided in our perceptions of the natural world, and what
may have been some of the factors that influenced this division? If, as discussed in
chapter two, our perceptions of meaning are influenced by concepts as they are
expressed through discourse, then this question becomes at least in part a question of
how discourse has changed over time. In other words, before we can begin answering
the question of why we perceive our world as we do, I believe we need to first
consider why we discourse about our world as we do. And this, at least in my mind,
is a question directly related to how our perceptions of meaning change and develop
over time as a function of the evolution of discourse.
How have modes of discourse expressing our relationship with the natural world
evolved over time, especially during the historical period surrounding the Scientific
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Revolution? In exploring this question, I will begin with a brief examination of the
general character of discourse as it operated just prior to the 16th century. I will then
explore how these pre-modern forms of discourse may have begun changing toward
the end of the 16th century.
Discourse Before the Scientific Revolution
Not Chaos-like together crush’d and bruis’d, But, as the world harmoniously
confus’d: Where order in variety we see, And where, tho’ all things differ all agree.
(Pope, 1736, Windsor Forest)
One of the first things that might come to a modern person’s mind when studying
the literary archive just prior to the 16th century is the singular strangeness with which
our late medieval ancestors seemed to describe themselves in relation to their natural
world. In fact, if we were to sample some of the primary forms of discourse leading
to the period surrounding the Scientific Revolution including, for instance, its
alchemy, herb-lore, bestiaries, medicine, magic and astrology, we would undoubtedly
be surprised at the many strange and even startling examples of a world that appears
to have been experienced very differently from our own today. And perhaps nowhere
would this difference be more palpable than in what can only be described as one of
the most distinguishing characteristics of the discourses predominating this pre-
modern period: the conception of the natural world as “a unified, organic cosmos,
ruled by a world soul and bound together by a macrocosm-microcosm relationship”
(Lindberg, 1992, p. 246).
The pervasiveness of this “macrocosm-microcosm relationship” is in fact so central
to pre-modern discourse that Barfield describes it as representing the “very texture”
of the medieval way of thinking and feeling about the world:
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Our medieval ancestors did not feel themselves to be either physically or
psychically isolated from their surroundings in the way that we do today.
Conversely their mind and soul were not felt to be imprisoned within, and
dependent upon their bodies. Intellectual classifications were accordingly less
dry and clear, and science: that general speculative activity which a later age
has split up into such categories as astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology,
psychology, was as yet almost an undivided whole. (Barfield, 1967, p.141)
It would appear from these early discourses that our late medieval ancestors
experienced their world far less from the outside and more from the inside, almost
like a coat or garment they felt themselves wrapped in as opposed to a kind of
external environment or stage upon which they merely lived and acted. This would
explain Barfield’s comment that “regarding his relationship to his environment, the
man of the Middle Ages was less like an island, and far more like an embryo”
(Barfield, 1988, p. 78). Simply stated, it was a world experienced as an integral
whole: where the earth and elements, plants and animals, men and women were all
perceived as being united together into a kind of “cosmic dance” of mutual influence.
As Sir John Davies (1569-1626) poetically refers to when writing:
Dancing (bright Lady) then began to be,
When the first seeds whereof the world did spring,
The Fire, Air, Earth, and Water did agree,
By Loves persuasion, Natures mighty King
And, in a dance such measure to observe,
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As all the world their motion should preserve.
(Davies, 1966, Orchestra)
Other expressions of this integrated macrocosm microcosm relationship can be
found throughout many of the discourses surrounding this pre-modern period. For
instance, in the discourses of medicine we find these same four terrestrial elements of
“Fire, Air, Earth and Water” blending together to form both the material universe and
the outer and inner constituents of the human body. This would explain Lindberg’s
(1992) comments that just as the cosmos were widely believed to be comprised of the
“four terrestrial elements animated by a living World Soul, so too was the human
body thought to be comprised of these same four elements animated by a living soul”
(p. 202).
Another related aspect of these early medical discourses was the belief that the four
terrestrial elements were also directly responsible for maintaining the health and
balance of the individual by producing what the physicians of the period referred to as
the four humours of the body. These four interrelated humours were believed to
control the biological functions of the body as well as the overall emotional and
spiritual “temperaments” of the individual. As such, an individual might either be
good humoured or bad humoured; even-tempered or high tempered, all depending on
the balance of these four humours in the physical body:
The human body contains the four humours of blood, phlegm, yellow bile and
black bile. These are the things that make up its constitutions and cause its
pains and health. Health is primarily that state in which these constituent
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substances are in the correct proportions to each other, both in strength and
quantity, and are well mixed. (as cited in Boaz, 1962, p. 116)
Another feature of these medieval medical discourses was the belief that the
arteries of the body flowed not with blood but rather with three interrelated spirits, or
ethers (meaning upper air). Hence, there was the animal spirit, the vital spirit and the
natural spirit, each one being intimately connected not only to the universe as a
whole, but also to a particular organ in the human body that endowed it with its own
peculiar power of influence over the individual’s physical, mental and spiritual
wellbeing:
Just as the substance of the heart is endowed with the force of the vital soul,
and the unique flesh of the liver with the faculty of the natural soul, in order
that the liver may make the thicker blood and natural spirit and the heart, the
blood which rushes through the body with the vital spirit, and thus these
organs may bring materials to all parts of the body through channels reserved
for them, so…the brain…prepares the animal spirit. (as cited in Boaz, 1962, p.
305)
In addition to these innumerable internal influences there were also many potent
external forces that were believed to subtly connect the individual to the universe.
For instance, it was generally accepted that celestial influences that began at a
person’s embryonic conception, “continued after birth…ultimately affecting such
things as temperament, health and disease” (Lindberg, 1992, p. 339). Moreover, each
symbol within of the great heavenly zodiac was felt to share an intimate relationship,
“or sympathy” with each of the four terrestrial elements. It was also widely believed
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that the celestial realm was composed of an even more perfect “fifth element” (known
widely during this period as the quintessence), felt to exhibit a unique power of
influence over all material things dwelling in the imperfect terrestrial realm below.
Therefore, if Jupiter, Saturn, or Mercury happened to be dominant in the general
“disposition of the stars” during an individual’s time of birth, it was generally taken
for granted that the individual would likewise develop a jovial, saturnine or mercurial
spiritual disposition. Ptolemy (90-168 BC) alludes to this fact in his Tetrabiblos:
…a certain power emanating from the eternal ethereal substance…permeates
the whole region about the earth. If, then, a man knows accurately the
movements of all the stars, sun, and the moon…and is capable of determining
in view of all these data…that it will be warmer or wetter? Why can he not,
too, with respect to an individual man, perceive the general quality of his
temperament from the atmosphere at the time of his birth, as for instance, that
he is such and such in body and such and such in soul. (as cited in Lindberg,
1992, pp. 275-276)
In addition to influencing the physical and psychical harmony of the individual,
this same celestial realm with its great zodiacal belt and many wandering planets was
also believed to be arranged in perfect harmonious proportion and embedded within
its own revolving crystalline sphere. It was even widely professed in many pre-
modern astronomical discourses that the motion of the heavenly spheres produced
their own symphony of heavenly music. Astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571-1630)
believed all heavenly objects participated in this symphony with resolute harmony
while raying down their complex influences upon the earth and its many inhabitants.
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Even Shakespeare (1564-1616) makes reference to this widely held belief in his
Merchant of Venice (1598):
Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patinas of bright gold:
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young –ey’d cherubim.
(Shakespeare, 1974, act v, scene I)
And what of the wandering planets? There was Earth at the center, dignified and
surrounded by its multitude of heavenly hosts. There was the moon with its power
over all growing things, responsible for giving the element silver its luminous sheen
and capable of impelling that strange kind of human madness called lunacy. There
was the planet Mercury who was believed to imbue the terrestrial element of mercury
so full of fire that the alchemist Paracelsus (1493-1541) claims “no fire can destroy it,
nor change its essence…it flees from the fire, and resolves itself spiritually into an
incombustible oil” (as cited in Boaz, 1962, p. 75). There was also Venus who shared
its spiritual essence with the terrestrial element of copper, and Mars who gave its
“spiritual virtue” to the element of iron, just as the “heaviness” of lead received its
spiritual essence from the somber influences of brooding Saturn.
In addition to being connected physically and structurally, this same heavenly
realm was also understood as being deeply infused with its own spiritual essence, or
anima mundi. In fact, many of these pre-modern discourses maintain that it was
precisely this great “World Soul” that tightly bound the microcosm and macrocosm
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together into its intimate relationship of unity and oneness. The Greek philosopher
Plato (427-347 BC), perhaps one of earliest and most eloquent proponents of this pre-
modern conception of a universal soul, wrote that “the world is a living being
endowed with a soul and intelligence ... a single visible living entity containing all
other living entities, which by their nature are all related” (Plato, 1956, 29/30).
The deep spiritual interrelatedness between all things appears to have been such a
seminal part of the medieval experience that the entire universe was often described
as if it were alive and “tingling with anthropomorphic life, dancing, ceremonial, a
festival not a machine” (Lewis, 1954, p. 4). Even Kepler, one of the founding fathers
of our modernist scientific outlook, often described the earth as if it were a great
breathing animal:
For here the sun-spots and little flames are brought forward as evidence of
their being exhalations from the sun which are analogous to the exhalations
from the Earth. (Kepler, 1952, p. 84)
Just as the flesh of the physical body was believed to be filled with a spiritual blood
proceeding from a living heart, so too was this great spiritually connected universe
often described as being filled with an ethereal light proceeding from a living sun that
was “so full of mirth and life that its happy face could be clearly seen by all” (as cited
in Lewis, 1954, p. 4). As for the sky surrounding this living sun, it too appears to
have been experienced very differently than the prosaic “atmosphere” that stretches
over our own heads today:
…if we are to judge from language, we must assume that when our ancestors
looked up to the blue vault they felt that they saw not merely a place, whether
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heavenly or earthly, but the bodily vesture, as it were, of a living Being. And
this fact is still extant in the formal resemblance between such words as diary
[day] and divine. (Barfield, 1967, p. 89)
I have attempted to sketch a general image of the natural world expressed in many
of the primary forms of discourse prevalent just before the beginning of the 16th
century. Obviously, much more could have been written regarding this late medieval
conception. But suffice it to say that if anybody seriously doubts that our medieval
ancestors experienced their world very differently than we do today, they need only to
spend some time looking into the literary productions of the period. There, in the rich
medieval doctrines of allegory and symbolism, signs and signatures, sympathy and
antipathy, actuality and potentiality, form and matter, they will find evidence of a
world perceived not merely as a spectator from without but rather as a participant
deeply embedded from within. That is because it was essentially a universe already
perceived as being within the percipients themselves:
Frequently the point was made through the macrocosm-microcosm analogy:
that humans not only belonged to the cosmos but were actually miniatures of
it. It followed that the cosmos and the individual person were linked by
structural and functional similarities, which bound them into a tight unity.
(Lindberg, 1992, p. 202)
I have described the general image of what the character of discourse was like just
prior to the Scientific Revolution. In the next section I will explore some of the ways
that this pre-modern form of discourse appears to have begun changing toward the
close of the 16th century.
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Discourse After the Scientific Revolution
Nature stood alone and lifeless. Dry number and rigid measure bound it with iron
chains. Into dust and air the priceless blossoms of life fell away in words obscure.
(Novalis, 1800, Hymns to the Night)
In his book English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (1954), the medieval
scholar C. S. Lewis (1896-1963) briefly summarizes the literary history of the
sixteenth century:
At the beginning of the century we find a literature still medieval in form and
spirit…the prose is clumsy, monotonous, garrulous; the verse…astonishingly
tame. Nothing is light, or tender, or fresh. All the authors write like elderly
men. The mid-century is an earnest, heavy-handed, commonplace age: a drab
age. Then, in the last quarter of the century, the unpredictable happens. With
startling suddenness we ascend. Fantasy, conceit, paradox, color, incantation
return: Youth returns…Sidney, Spenser, Shakespeare, Hooker display what is
almost a new culture… Nothing in the earlier history of our period would
have enabled even the sharpest observer to foresee this transformation.
(Lewis, 1954, p. 1)
There are two important points to make regarding the outline above. The first is
that a sudden and dramatic change in the literary culture began occurring toward the
end of the 16th century. The second is the unforeseen direction this cultural
transformation actually followed. I begin this section with this general outline
because I believe it is fairly indicative of how discourse evolved during the 16th
century in general, especially those discourses expressing relationship with the
natural world. We’ve already seen, for instance, how the primary discourse
describing the natural world was still largely medieval in form and spirit prior to the
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16th century. However, as the century progresses, especially toward its close, we see
this rich medieval form of discourse beginning to change.
The break that began emerging toward the end of the 16th century in the smooth
flow of the medieval forms of discourse was rather extraordinary from an historical
perspective, especially when we consider the fact that these integrated discourses had
more or less persisted in their original form since before the time of Plato. Although
this initial shift in discourse would still be many years away from its ultimate
culmination in the 17th and 18th centuries, the alteration that began toward the end of
the 16th century seems to have carried with it the beginnings of a conceptual
revolution of such magnitude that the cultural historian Alexander Koyre (1892-1962)
described it as a point in history in which:
…man lost his place in the world, or, more correctly perhaps, lost the very
world in which he was living and about which he was thinking, and had to
transform and replace not only his fundamental concepts and attributes, but
even the framework of his thought. (Koyre, 1957, p. 4)
Simply stated, this late 16th century period was a time of great change in how
humans perceived and understood their natural world. It was a time in which brave
new scientists like Copernicus, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, as well as many
others began to challenge and rethink many of the long held doctrines of the medieval
intellectual tradition. This break in the smooth flow of discourse toward the end of
the 16th century produced “a radical conceptual shift that eventually destroyed the
foundations of natural philosophy as it was practiced for nearly two thousand years”
(Lindberg, 1992, p. 361).
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What then was the nature of this break in discourse, and more importantly how did
it begin influencing the conceptual outlook of the period surrounding the Scientific
Revolution and beyond? There are of course many different points of departure, but I
believe one of the most insightful and perhaps poignant expressions of how this
change in discourse actually began altering the conceptual landscape of the pre-
modern natural world can be seen in a sonnet written by Edgar Allan Poe (1809-
1849) many years after the beginnings of the Scientific Revolution.
Science! True daughter of Old Time thou art!
Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes.
Why preyest thou thus upon the poet’s heart,
Vulture, whose wings are dull realities,…
Hast thou not dragged Diana from her car?
And driven the Hamadryad from the wood
To seek a shelter in some happier star…
(Poe, 1996, Sonnet to Science)
This sonnet suggests that the new “scientific” forms of discourse that began
emerging toward the end of the 16th century involved a new way of “peering” at the
world that essentially “altered” all that was seen. This I believe is an insightful
observation by Poe, especially when we consider the fact that some of the original
root meanings for the word “peer” (from the word “appear”) include such definitions
as, “to cause to emerge,” “to free oneself from,” “to bring into sharp distinction,” “to
break away from,” and “to materialize.” It would seem, then, that this new scientific
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way of “peering” at the world not only “materialized” all that was seen but
encouraged a “breaking away from” the natural world in a brand new way.
This brings us to perhaps one of the most distinguishing characteristics between the
discourses operating before the 16th century and those that began emerging toward its
close, and that is in how the latter began to place a new emphasis on seeing the world
from a perspective of quantity (from the Greek word posotes meaning “how-much-
ness”) as opposed to one of quality (from the Greek word poiotes meaning “what-
kind-ness”). For to materialize anything means to essentially endow it with a set of
quantitative attributes that can be weighed and measured such as mass, volume and
density. I believe Aristotle captures one of the most salient aspects of this new form
of discourse when he describes quantity as a unique perspective that ultimately
emphasizes:
…parts external to one another. It is an instance of what Aristotle calls a
category, which is really to be understood as a mode of illumination by virtue
of which the world becomes visible in a particular way. In other words, for
Aristotle, quantity does not refer to a specific content of the world, which is
given materially, but a way of seeing which constitutes the world in the form
of parts external to one another. (Bortoft, 1996, p. 173)
This quantitative mode of illuminating the world as distinct parts external to one
another is a sharp departure from the more qualitative medieval outlook that strongly
emphasized the interconnectedness and intrinsic “belongingness” of all things. As a
result, the new scientific “peering” described by Poe appears to have become the
primary means by which the natural world began to be “predicated on the rational
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justification for a universal, mathematical, quantitative understanding of nature”
(Burnham & Fieser, 2001, p. 6). In fact, this new proclivity for describing the world
from a context of mathematics was another striking feature of these scientific
discourses that began emerging toward the end of the 16th century. Lewis refers to
this new preoccupation with mathematical quantification when describing the overall
influence of the Copernican heliocentric theory in astronomy:
It must be remembered that the De Revolutionibus (1543) of Copernicus put
forward only a theory: verification, at the hands of Kepler and Galileo, came
only at the end of the 16th century, and general acceptance later still…What
proved important about the new astronomy was not the mere alteration in our
map of space but the methodological revolution which verified it…What was
fruitful in the thought of the new scientists was the bold new use of
mathematics in the construction of hypothesis tested not by observation
simply but by controlled observation of phenomena that could be precisely
measured. (Lewis, 1954, p. 3)
Therefore, as important as this “bold new use of mathematics” appears to have
been to the new scientific forms of discourse, one need only, for instance, look into
the works of Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy and a host of medieval Scholars to see that
plenty of mathematical analysis and scientific hypothesizing occurred under the
medieval intellectual tradition as well. What emerged toward the end of the 16th
century was not so much a new emphasis on the use of mathematics in forming
testable hypotheses, but a completely new interpretation of meaning regarding the
role of mathematics in relation to the purpose of a scientific hypothesis. In order to
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understand this change in meaning it might be helpful to consider the relationship
between mathematics and the purpose of a scientific hypothesis prior to the end of the
16th century.
Three levels of knowledge regarding the natural universe were normally assumed
under the medieval intellectual tradition. The first and lowest level was knowledge
gleaned simply from the senses. This sensory knowledge of the world was
considered the lowest because it was always in a state of flux, and was therefore
incapable of grasping anything in the way of permanent truth. The highest level of
knowledge, on the other hand, was considered to be an exclusively extrasensory
knowledge. It was thought to be obtainable only through reflection, meditation and
contemplation of perfect divine ideas and immutable truths.
There was, however, an intermediate level of knowledge, one that arose from the
interplay between the apparent knowledge gleaned from the senses and the actual
knowledge contemplated by the mind. This intermediate level of knowledge was
mathematics. The importance of this fact is that it shows the position that
mathematics was afforded under the medieval intellectual tradition. Plato, for
instance, described mathematics as a kind of “bastard knowledge,” since it was
neither completely sensory nor completely rational, but rather a kind of “illegitimate”
offspring of the two.
A good example of the unique status of mathematics in the medieval tradition can
be seen in its incorporation in the practice of pre-modern astronomy. The actual
movements of the heavenly bodies under the medieval tradition were rationally
understood as perfect circles at constant speeds. However, the apparent movements
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of these heavenly bodies as actually observed by astronomers were something very
different. Hence, rather than explaining and representing perfect truths of the
universe, mathematics became a tool for “saving the appearances” by devising
hypothetical explanations that could account for discrepancies between what the
senses apparently observed and what the mind actually “knew” to be true through
reason. The English poet John Milton (1608-1674) refers to this unique role of
mathematics in the practice of ancient science when writing in Paradise Lost (1667):
Hereafter, when they come to model heaven,
And calculate the stars; how they will wield
The mighty frame; how build, unbuild, contrive,
To save the appearances; how gird the sphere
With centric and eccentric scribbled o'er,
Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb.
(Milton, 1996, Book VII)
The role of a mathematical scientific hypothesis, then, at least under the medieval
tradition, was to serve as a kind of ad hoc explanation or theoretical contrivance that
incorporated geometrical models to help explain why a particular phenomenon
appeared as it did to the senses:
The geometrical paths and movement devised for the planets were, in the
minds of those who invented them, hypotheses…They were arrangements;
devices for saving the appearances; and the Greek and medieval astronomers
were not at all disturbed by the fact that the same appearances could be saved
by two or more quite different hypotheses…All that mattered was, which was
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the simplest and the most convenient for practical purposes; for none of them
had any essential part in truth and knowledge (Barfield, 1988, p. 49).
Toward the end of the 16th century all this begins to change. Instead of
representing a mere model of the cosmos or theoretical contrivance for “saving the
appearances,” the idea of a mathematical hypothesis suddenly begins to take on a new
life of “literalness” of its own. This change in the meaning of a mathematical
hypothesis appears to have been solidified conceptually when astronomers like
Copernicus, Kepler, Brahe and Galileo began to suggest that mathematical
hypotheses that succeeded in saving all the appearances should be accepted not only
as hypothetical models for explaining the appearances but also as a true physical
representations of the actual.
This shift in the meaning toward a kind of mathematical validation of the rational
through direct observation was, as Sir Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979) explains,
“enough to outshine everything since the rise of Christianity and reduce the
Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes” (as cited in Barfield,
1988, p. 51). This shift represented not merely a new theoretical approach to
practicing science in general, but rather an entirely “new theory on the nature of
theory; namely that, if a hypothesis saves all the physical appearances, it is essentially
identical to the truth” (Barfield, 1988, p. 51).
This new conceptual framework for understanding the role of mathematics in
forming testable hypotheses was a sharp departure from the Platonic framework
celebrated under the medieval tradition. It appears that one of the primary results of
this shift was a new proclivity for describing and representing the natural world no
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longer as an integrated living organism, but rather as a dead, detached, mechanical
system.
This was another striking difference between the discourses operating before the
beginning of the 16th century and those that began to emerge toward its close.
Perhaps nowhere was this difference more obvious than in the discourses surrounding
the philosophical idea of “self-movement.” Under the medieval philosophies of Plato
and Aristotle, the distinction between that which was “self-moved” and that which
was moved by something outside of itself had always represented the very dividing
line between the spiritual and the material.
However, toward the end of the 16th century we see an almost complete reversal of
this long held philosophical distinction beginning to unfold. Instead of describing the
intrinsic qualities of the organic and spiritual, the meaning of “self-moved” performs
an almost complete “semantic volte face” (Barfield, 1967, p. 187) and begins to be
applied to dead, inanimate, material things such as clocks and machines. This shift in
the meaning of language used to describe the idea of self-movement was another
sharp departure from the earlier medieval microcosm macrocosm conception of the
universe. Instead of emphasizing the dependence and interconnectedness of all
things, this new interpretation suggested that mechanical things needed no assistance
from an outside mover in order to function since they were seen as self-contained,
independent entities that essentially functioned automatically (from the Greek word
automatus meaning self-moved):
The machine is geometry in motion, and the new picture of the universe was
made possible by parallel developments in physics, where the new theory of
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inertia assumed, for the first time in the history of the world, that bodies can
go on moving indefinitely without an animate or psychic mover. It was soon
to be stamped indelibly on men’s imaginations by the circumstance of their
being ever more and more surrounded by actual artificial machinery on the
earth. The whole point of a machine is, that, for as long as it goes on moving,
it goes on by itself without man’s participation. (Barfield, 1988, p. 51)
So instead of perceiving the world as a great living organism imbued with a
pervasive World Soul, what we find in the discourses toward the end of 16th century
is an increasing number of references describing the world and body from a non-
participatory, mechanical framework of meaning. Thus, in the works of William
Harvey (1578-1657), we find the human heart and its valves described for the first
time as “the mechanism, which Nature has devised …strangely like that which
artificial means have produced in the machinery of mills.” (as cited in Boaz, 1962, p.
53). Likewise, throughout the writings of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), the heavenly
realms are repeatedly described as the great “machine of Heaven” (as cited in Boaz,
1963, p. 115). An unknown 16th century writer even seems to have even anticipated
the “clockwork universe” of William Paley (1743-1805):
God’s the main spring, that maketh every way,
All the small wheels of this great Engin play.
(as cited in Barfield, 1988, p. 45)
It would appear, then, that this new scientific discourse not only relegated the
natural world to a level of objectified material with its quantitative peering gaze, but
also systematically abolished the spiritual qualities from the world of experiences by
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reducing that world to a level of mere mechanistic cause and effect. Thus we find in
Poe’s sonnet the moon goddess Diana being “dragged from her car” and the
Hamadryads being forcibly driven from the woods. As Davy (1985) explains:
The thoughts we embody in measurement are only applicable to dead
phenomena; for measurement means dividing up into units, which can be
counted, and no living thing can be thus fragmented without dying. Hence, it
is a form of thought entirely appropriate to an inanimate world. (p. 8)
By reducing the natural world to the level of dead mechanical objects that can be
quantified, validated, and constituted mathematically, the new scientific discourse
appears to have promoted a conceptual framework of independence, division and
separation from nature as opposed to a framework of unity, participation and
integration with nature. As a result, that which was once experienced as a microcosm
macrocosm “Thou” began to be conceived as a material mechanical “It.” This
conception is still promoted and sustained today in many of our modernist discourses
continuing to survive as one of the:
…guiding principles of our modern scientific method of inquiry…this
principle of mechanism, or, the belief that the world operates like a machine
and that supernatural causes have no place in modern science. (Rothman,
1995, p. 6)
In this section I have described examples of how the primary forms of discourse
regarding the natural world began to change toward the end of the 16th century.
While many different aspects of this change could have been discussed, for the
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purpose of this study I focused primarily on those surrounding the discourses of
mathematics and those surrounding the discourses of mechanism.
It is difficult to know just how deeply these shifts in the linguistic meanings
actually impacted the thoughts and feelings of the 16th century Elizabethans.
However, at a minimum they appear to have enhanced their capacity for
conceptualizing the natural world as a thing distinct and divided from themselves.
By “peering” at the natural world from a new conceptual framework of separation
and division, the universe of our medieval ancestors seems to have been transformed
from a world of unity and integration to one emphasizing quantity, extrinsic material
relationships and mechanical independence.
Genealogy
He who sets to work on a different strand destroys the whole fabric.
(Confucius, 500 BC, The Analects)
Having identified and described some of the general aspects of how discourse
appears to have shifted in its smooth flow from one of integration with nature to one
of separation from nature, I will now explore some of the cultural-historical factors
that may have influenced these long held concepts of mathematics, hypothesis, and
self-movement to begin changing their context of meaning toward the end of the 16th
century.
As noted in chapter two, Thomas Kuhn asserted that no part of the aim of an
existing paradigm is to call forth new sorts of phenomena. Those that do not conform
to a society’s existing conceptual framework are usually “not seen at all.” Moreover,
Kuhn believed that the cultural context of a particular community was directed not at
displacing the existing cultural framework of meaning but rather at increasing the
62
scope and “articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already
supplies” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 24).
This suggests that the forces that ultimately influence a culturally based framework
of meaning, or paradigm, to begin shifting in its overall context may not come in the
form of a direct attack or challenge from without, since those external forces would
either not be seen at all or else would be assimilated into the existing paradigms
conceptual framework. Therefore, if the elements of change do not necessarily assail
a paradigm consciously from without, perhaps they emerge unconsciously from
within. In other words, it is possible that the change in discourse described above was
not so much the result of an all out epistemological attack by empiricism from
without as much as it may have been the result of a subtle alteration of the pre-
modern framework from within.
How might have movements occurring within the cultural context surrounding the
Scientific Revolution influenced a change in discourse? This question, as discussed
in chapter three, will represent the genealogical focus of this study. While archeology
was used to identify and describe the manner in which discourse evolved and changed
during the Scientific Revolution, a genealogical examination will be used to reveal
how movements within the cultural context surrounding this period may have
influenced this shift in discourse. Before beginning this exploration, however, it
might be helpful to begin with a short description of how our modernist perspective
often represents the role culture and history play in the development of our
knowledge of the world.
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According to empiricism, our knowledge of the world is essentially a body of facts
and theories discovered and articulated by various men and women (usually
scientists) skilled in the methods of empirical observation. Sometimes the process of
discovery is influenced by cultural-historical factors such as the persistence of old
superstitions, political persecutions, wars, technical advances, or even serendipity.
Examples like Galileo’s telescopic discoveries and the church’s persecution of
Copernicus are usually cited as good examples of how cultural and historical forces
can influence the “progress” of knowledge.
What this empirical explanation fails to acknowledge is the conceptual and
linguistic elements involved in the formation of our knowledge of the world. Another
problem is that empiricism not only assumes but presupposes a non-participatory
framework of meaning by representing itself as a kind of intrinsically objective
methodology. One of the major goals of this study is to examine factors that may
have influenced the development of our own modernist discourse with nature, which
is essentially the discourse of empiricism.
What factors, then, may have influenced the emergence of the discourse of
empiricism? Since the mere existence of empiricism is not sufficient to explain its
emergence, it is reasonable to turn elsewhere, perhaps to what Hubner calls the
“spontaneous acts” of history, or to what Kuhn refers to as the “arbitrary element” of
“personal and historical accidents.” But this would imply an alternative explanation
regarding why modern humans began separating themselves from the organic
processes of their natural world in the first place. It would require an explanation that
does not merely negate our cognitive participation or presuppose the very thing it
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attempts to explain, but rather one that embraces the dynamic relationship between
discourse, culture and our perceptions of meaning.
What, then, were some of the major cultural-historical factors that may have subtly,
even unconsciously, influenced a shift away from a pre-modern integrated conception
of the natural world and toward our own modernist scientific conception of separation
and division? While there are many cultural factors that could be considered, for this
study I will focus primarily on the movements of Humanism, Puritanism, The Divine
Right of Kings, and Mystical Science.
Humanism and the Externalization of Language
And priests in black gowns were walking their rounds,
And binding with briars my joys and desires.
(William Blake, 1789, The Garden of Love)
It is difficult to arrange the cultural context of the 16th century into distinct
categories for comparison. There are few hard lines that can be drawn between the
various cultural revolutions and movements of thought that flourished during this
period. As Lewis explains, it was a dynamic period when “a humanist could be a
papist, a scientist could be a magician, and a skeptic could be an astrologer” (Lewis,
1954, p. 63). However, at least one point of general agreement is that the cultural
context surrounding the 16th century was a period of great change regarding how
humans perceived themselves in relation to their natural world.
A good example involves one of the most influential and wide-sweeping social
movements of the period: the intellectual revolution that began to take shape in the
world of education. During this period two distinct things were beginning to happen
to the discourses of learning. One was the dying out of an older medieval tradition of
Aristotelian metaphysics known as Scholasticism, and the other was the emergence of
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a new learning tradition called Humanism based on the rediscovery of many ancient
Greek, Roman and Hebrew texts. This new intellectual tradition was important not
only because it represented a sharp departure from the doctrines and teachings of the
Middle-Ages, but because it began establishing an entirely new intellectual
“intercourse with the ancient literatures of Greece and Rome, and with it, a positive
stream of new literary borrowings from that literature” (Barfield, 1967, p. 64).
The rediscovery of these ancient manuscripts brought with it an entirely new range
of intellectual, emotional and imaginative concepts that could now be expressed
through discourse. Even now it is difficult to appreciate the magnitude of the impact
of this new influx of Greek and Latin words in producing the language and concepts
currently used to think and speak about our world. However, it seems this Humanist
movement influenced the shift from a medieval discourse of unity and integration
with nature in at least two important ways.
The first was a shifting of the focus of language outward and upon itself. In other
words, it appears that it was the Humanist scholars of the 16th century who first began
to preoccupy themselves with the external structures of language. They were not only
some of the first scholars to contribute to such linguistic studies as grammar and
philology, but also some of the first to begin standardizing the way that language
“ought” to look and sound from a structural point of view. This new preoccupation
with the external structures of language appears to have been partly based in a kind of
linguistic infatuation with a “non-medieval” form of Latin based largely on writings
of the ancient Roman politician Cicero (106-43 BC).
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There arose in the 16th century a kind of “purist” movement against the linguistic
formations of the Middle-Ages. It was therefore not uncommon during this period to
find the very same Humanist scholars who were ready to sell all their possessions to
acquire a copy of an ancient manuscript of Cicero just as ready to commit the text of
some obscure medieval Schoolman to the fire. In fact, such censorships were not
uncommon, as was the case in 1550 when Humanist scholars from Oxford formally
banished certain medieval texts from the libraries due to their “barbaric and ignorant”
content.
This strong bias against the grammatical forms of the Medieval Latin appears to
have encouraged an over-emphasis on the external and structural aspects of language
and to have placed a new emphasis on conforming genuine expressions of emotion
into a prescribed grammatical format:
Whatever else Humanism was, it was emphatically not a movement towards
freedom and expansion. It was the impulse of men who feel themselves
simple, rustic, and immature, towards sophistication, urbanity, and ripeness.
In a word, it was the most complete opposite of what we find in the Romantic
desire for the primitive and spontaneous...The desire was for order, and
discipline, weight, and decorum. (Lewis, 1954, p. 24)
This Humanist movement, then, appears to have produced a simultaneous shift
away from linguistic spontaneity and freedom of expression toward one of control,
discipline, and conformity of expression. Even to the point, as Lewis (1954)
explains, that some Humanists scholars thought it better “to omit a beauty than to
leave in anything that might have shadow of offence” (p. 24). As a result, the
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freedom, depth and even mystical quality of words as they were experienced and
expressed in the language of the Middle-Ages began to take on a new veneer of
unnaturalness and external artificiality under the pedantic gaze of these 16th century
Humanists.
The linguistic relegation of expression to structure helps explain some of the
disgust the Humanist felt toward all things medieval, especially things like chivalrous
romance. Of all literary forms the romance, or fairy tale, is not only one of the most
expressive, it is also one of the most dynamic and flexible in grammatical structure.
This is because the first purpose of a romance is to express a felt meaning. As such,
the form of expression is always secondary to the feelings, desires and longings that
the author wishes to express.
For the Humanists, however, the external form and the overall “style” of the
language was of primary import, even if it meant compromising feeling and depth.
To express oneself without regard for proper grammatical form was to display ones
ignorance and barbarism. This helps explain why ardent humanists like Juan Luis
Vive (1492-1540) warned women and children that “it would be better to have ones
eyes put out than use them to read such stuff as Lancelot and the Round Table” (as
cited in Lewis, 1954, p. 29).
Even the newly discovered poetry of Virgil and Homer was valued by Humanist
scholars only insofar as it could be used as a kind of encyclopedia of ancient
knowledge to acquire such practical life skills as medicine, astrology, battle strategy
and cooking. As Lewis explains:
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The humanists could not really bring themselves to believe that the poets
really cared about the shepherds, lovers, warriors, voyages and battles. They
must be a disguise for something more adult. (Lewis, 1954, p. 28)
In addition to emphasizing grammatical structure over genuine expression,
Humanism influenced the kind of concepts that were actually promoted through the
newly adopted ancient form of Latin. As already described, the Humanist scholars
were largely responsible for shifting the linguistic framework away from Medieval
Latin and toward a “purer,” more ancient form of Latin based in the writings of
Cicero. This, I believe, is an extremely important point since it is often assumed that
the Humanist movement was actually a return to a more organic “Greek spirit” of
thinking and feeling about the world in general. However, as Lewis points out, “it
would be quite a mistake to think of the 16th century as a period influenced by the
Greek spirit of literature:”
The humanist culture was overwhelmingly Latin. Greek was given abundance
of ‘mouth honor,’ but only the minor Greek authors were really relished.
Greek will not take the hard, high polish, which was what the humanist
principally cared for: it is too supple, sensitive, and intimate. (Lewis, 1954, p.
27)
Again, the main thrust of the Humanist discourse was a rebellion against the
medieval form of Latin and a return to an older more original Latin. But it was the
medieval form of Latin, the form hated and rejected by the Humanist scholars, that
actually came closer to capturing the true organic spirit of the Greek language:
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In the later days of the empire…when Rome had absorbed the myths of
Greece and Egypt and sterilized them both, the soul of Europe was stirring
afresh in the north. Contact between the Roman tongue and that of their
subjects, the Celtic ‘Galli’ in north Italy and beyond the Alps, had grown
more and more intimate. Gradually there came into being a sort of hybrid
Low Latin, the father of modern French and the other Romance languages,
which in many cases expressed Celtic notions and feelings in Latin forms. So
it was that new life came to be breathed into some of the dead abstractions of
Roman mythology; but it was a very different life from the old one. (Barfield,
1967, pp. 93-94)
This more romantic, expressive Low Latin was the “barbaric” Medieval Latin
against which the Humanist scholars ultimately rebelled. Therefore, by promoting a
return to a purer form of Latin, the Humanist scholars of the 16th century encouraged
an influx of original Latin words, as well as, a new kind of discourse saturated in
these same Latin concepts. This is important because it is the Greek influences in our
language, not the Latin, that tend to be more expressive of the inner world of
thoughts, feelings and spiritual relationships. As Barfield explains, the conceptual
influences of the original Latin language tend to focus more on the physical, concrete
and material aspects of the external world:
Greek and Latin form a very large and very important part of the English
language. All through the history of our nation the two threads can be seen
running together…for words which are genuinely of Latin origin are very
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often concerned with the material outer world, but words of Greek origin are
more likely to be landmarks in the world of thought and feeling. (1967, p. 58)
An example of this can be seen in the strong Latin influence on the language
surrounding our modern legal system, especially regarding words describing concepts
of authority, law and the external social relationships between humans and the
material world. In fact, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) borrowed from this linguistic
repository to describe the external processes of the natural world as early as the
beginning of the 17th century.
Latin is also the language from which we derive many of our modern concepts of
physical science, including such words as experiment, investigate, distinguish, matter,
and even the word science itself (from scientia meaning “to know”). The Greek
language, on the other hand, is more intuitive, organic and fluid in its overall form
and structure. It is therefore capable of expressing many different colors, depths and
textures of feeling and meaning:
There is a strong tendency in the Greek language with its reckless profusion of
double epithets, its looser word order, and its nervous, restless twitching of
grammatical particles, to make itself felt as a living, muscular organism rather
than as a structure. (Barfield, 1973, p. 98)
By emphasizing the external structures of language and the conceptual framework
of original Latin discourse, the Humanist movement that began emerging during the
Scientific Revolution appears to have created a subtle tension between the emotional,
spiritual and spontaneous world of genuine Greek expression and the artificial,
rational and materialistic world of a more ancient Latin linguistic formation.
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Although the “Greek spirit” of language eventually regained its voice in the Romantic
poetry of the 18th and 19th centuries, the heavy Latin influences of the 16th century
clearly displaced both the Greek-inspired spirit of language and the organic
conception of the natural world in general.
This was only one of the cultural changes that began to unfold and influence the
organic medieval outlook. As we shall see, even more subtle changes were beginning
to take place not only in minds of the 16th century Elizabethans, but in their hearts and
souls as well.
The Reformation and “Conquering” the Natural Self
To her fair works did nature link: The human soul that through me ran;
And much it grieved my heart to think: What man has made of man.
(Wordsworth, 1798, Lines Written in Early Spring)
In addition to Humanist influences on medieval traditions of learning, the 16th
century was also a time of cultural change in the world of religion. It was during this
period that Martin Luther (1483-1546) posted his Ninety-Five Theses attacking the
Roman Catholic Church, thus beginning what is now referred to as the great
Reformation. It was also during this period that King Henry VIII (1491-1547),
wanting his marriage annulled, quarreled with the Pope and declared himself
Supreme Headship of the Church of England. Acts like these sowed the seeds of the
Puritan movement. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation were to result in the
bloody persecution of Catholics and Protestants for centuries to come. It was
therefore a time of great cultural change in how the Elizabethans thought and felt
about their God, their world, their neighbors, and of course themselves. It was also a
time of religious persecution and martyrdom when many were called not only to die
for their religious beliefs, but also to take up their swords and kill for them.
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A close affinity appears to have existed between the new Puritan Movement in
religion and the new Humanist Movement in learning already described. Both the
Puritans and the Humanists shared a common hatred of all things medieval. Both
groups saw themselves at the forefront of the war against the ignorance of the
Middle-Ages, and both wanted to accomplish the same central mission: to make a
clean sweep of the medieval Greek influences. For the Humanist, this took the form
of an attempt to fortify the mind against the Greek spirit manifested in the medieval
linguistic barbarism. For the Puritan, it consisted primarily of an attempt to purge the
human heart of the last vestiges of Greek paganism. As a result, both groups subtly
endorsed a kind of resistance to the freedom and spontaneity characteristic of the
more Greek inspired medieval outlook. For the Humanist, this resistance manifested
itself by a return to a more ancient form of Latin language. But for the Puritan, it
took the form of a return to the harsh moral asceticism of the ancient Roman Stoics.
The Stoic philosophy of ancient Greece and Rome formed an important part of the
newly discovered corpus of ancient manuscripts contemplated by Humanist scholars
during this period. The Stoics believed a good life meant first and foremost a
virtuous life. They therefore refused to be ruled by their natural passions, since they
believed strong emotions obscured ones ability for making sound moral judgments.
Under this school of thought, the individual was instructed to control, restrain and
ultimately conquer the natural passions in order to obtain wisdom, happiness, and
even salvation itself. However, this Stoical subjugation of the natural passions
represented a sharp departure from an older medieval outlook that maintained that
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genuine emotional responses were not contrary to reason, but rather a central part of
it.
The view that genuine emotion is part of reason can be seen in the writings of
Augustine (354-430) who defined virtue as ordo amoris, or the ordinate condition of
the passions, in which every object is to be accorded the unique kind and degree of
love that was appropriate to it. Aristotle was also convinced that the true aim of
education was ultimately to teach the pupil to make the right emotional response by
learning to “like and dislike” what was natural and appropriate. Similarly, in Plato’s
Republic we find that young students who are not in harmony with reason and nature
must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust and hatred for those things that really
are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful. In this way, the student who has been
rightly trained in “just sentiments” and “ordinate affections” would be prepared to:
…see what was amiss in the ill-made works of man or the ill-grown works of
nature, and with a just distaste blame and hate the ugly…while giving
delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into their soul and being nourished by
it, so that they can become a person of gentle heart. (as cited in Lewis, 1974,
1956, p. 27)
Plato’s “rational emotional response” to nature appears to have been as much a part
of the medieval ethical tradition as his “World Soul” was a part of the medieval
conception of the natural universe. Indeed, this view was central to the organic
conception of an integrated universe in which all things, including the passions, were
endowed with an appropriate place in the natural order. This helps explain the heavy
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emotional content of medieval literature, especially medieval literary discourses
expressing heroes, heroines and paragons of virtue:
Achilles wept, Aeneas wept, the Roman legionaries wept, Hrothgar wept,
Roland wept, and Lancelot, to his lasting glory, wept like a beaten child at the
healing of Sir Urre. (Lewis, 1954, p. 52)
In the 16th century this begins to change. It was this kind of “pagan” indulgence of
the passions that especially disgusted the 16th century Puritans. This can be seen in
the sharp change of tone of the 16th century literature where male characters are
seldom seen crying, at least not without first apologizing or expressing a sense of
shame, as Shakespeare wrote: “he had not so much of man in him as to restrain his
tears.” Thus, rather than seeing human passions as a occupying an ordinate place in
the overall natural scheme of things, the Puritans regarded the passions as a kind of
unnatural obstacle, a weakness that ought to be resisted by the rational soul. As a
result, the Puritan’s overall desire was not for integration, acquiescence or
participation in the microcosm-macrocosm relationship, but to rise above and conquer
the natural. They wanted order, self-control, and most of all an outward appearance
of stoical indifference toward the natural passions. In this they were not unlike the
Humanist scholars who also wanted order, decorum, and eloquence in speech as
opposed to genuine and natural expression of feeling.
Therefore, just as we observed in the Humanistic prejudices against the freedom
and spontaneity of expression in language, this new Puritanical Stoicism appears to
have promoted a similar kind of prejudice against natural, spontaneous, and impulsive
tendencies within the Elizabethans themselves. As a result, the medieval longing to
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be natural to participate in the great “cosmic dance” of the natural order, was no
longer encouraged under the new Puritan perspective. This Stoical indifference
toward the natural passions ultimately produced a new kind of cultural idol in the
literary productions of the late 16th century:
The Stoic sapien is the image really potent in Elizabethan literature. He is
(like Chapman’s Clermont) ‘gladly obedient’ to anything ‘the high and
general cause’ may lay on him; he regards the world (like more than one
Shakespeare character) merely as a stage; he is content (like Gyon) with what
Nature needs; a king over himself (like Miltons’ Christ and Dryden’s
Almanzor); indifferent (like Addison’s Cato) to the success or failure of his
own actions. His mind (like Milton’s Satan) is its own place. All these
attitudes…yield an image that influenced the English poetic mind very deeply:
this image of an unmoved, unconquerable, mortal god. (Lewis, 1954, p. 54)
Once again, what is unique about each of these literary characters is their
expression of stoical independence, emotional indifference, and self-control over the
influences of the natural passions. These images move away from the earlier
medieval conception of a deep integration and unity with the natural world. They
shift toward a schism between the natural and the spiritual (a schism not unlike that
of Descartes’ dualism between mind and body), promoting a kind of “mind over
matter” approach to the universe as a whole.
Although there was certainly plenty of asceticism in the medieval periods leading
up to the 16th century, it is important to note the difference in the kind of asceticism
expressed by the medieval writers and that averred by the Puritan Stoics. One needs
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only, for instance, to look into a medieval work like that of St. Francis of Assisi
(1182-1226) and his Canticles of the Sun (1224) to see the sharp contrast between
these different ideas of asceticism. There in the mirth and youth of Assisi’s poetic
appellations describing his “brother fire,” and “sister water” we see the bold
difference between the kind of asceticism that denies the world in order to receive it
on a deeper level of participation, and the kind of asceticism that merely denies the
world for the sake of self-denial. G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) communicates this
unique spirit of the medieval ascetics:
There was nothing negative about it; it was not a regimen or a stoical
simplicity of life. It was not self-denial merely in the sense of self-control. It
was as positive as a passion; it had all the air of being as positive as a
pleasure. (Chesterton, 1989, p. 81)
In other words, the medieval asceticism was based in a desire for finding a deeper
integration into the natural order of things. This would explain why many medieval
ascetics could write such beautiful poetry regarding the pleasures and beauties of the
physical body and natural world, whereas Puritan ascetics like John Fisher (1459-
1535) could only see the natural world as a place of “dyrtie corruption,” and the
physical body as a detestable “sachell full of dung” (as cited in Lewis, 1954, p. 163).
That is because, for the 16th century Puritans, the natural world was but a place of sin
and death, a battleground where the wars between reason and passion were to be
waged as for eternity. If the human soul were ever to be saved from the bondage of
“flesh,” it would happen only through the slow arduous process of the rational-self
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conquering the natural-self and aspiring to the level of an “unmoved, unconquerable,
mortal god.”
This Puritanical idea of an individual rising to the level of a spiritual sovereign
over the natural passions points to another area of cultural change that began to
unfold during this period. This is the area of sovereignty and its relationship to the
political idea of the “Divine Right of Kings.”
The Divine Right of Kings and the Natural Law
And he wore a kingly crown; and in his grasp a scepter shone;
On his brow this mark I saw; I AM GOD AND KING AND LAW.
(Shelley, 1819, The Mask of Anarchy)
It has been noted how the period surrounding the Scientific Revolution was a time
when King Henry VIII assumed the Headship of the Church of England. This
political usurpation of the Pope’s spiritual authority seems to have created a new
conceptual context for understanding the king’s role as a political and spiritual
sovereign over the people. To understand this change it might be helpful to briefly
discuss how the idea of monarchial sovereignty was conceived during the medieval
period.
Under Aristotelian philosophy we are told that the highest civic ruling power does
not legislate at all, but merely administers and enforces an already preexisting
“natural law.” Unfortunately, Aristotle does not tell us the source of this natural law,
but the early Christian theologians instinctively ascribed it to God himself. It was
therefore understood under this medieval conception that the king was not the
originator of the law since his civil laws were only microcosmic participations in
God’s universal natural laws.
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As a result, if the king’s civil laws did not conform to God’s natural laws they were
to be deemed “unjust” and the king “a tyrant” who has rebelled against God and rules
only by his own selfish lusts. Therefore, under the Aristotelian political framework,
the tyrant’s laws were understood to be without basis, and as such had no rightful
claim on the people’s civil obedience. It was not only the duty of the people to ignore
these unjust laws, but their moral responsibility to resist them, even through outward
rebellion if necessary.
As such, the king was given no absolute, intrinsic authority under the medieval
perspective of sovereignty. Whatever political authority he had, he received or
“borrowed” from the absolute authority of God himself. This is just another example
of the medieval microcosm-macrocosm relationship, in that the king’s earthly
authority was seen as an integrated participation in God’s universal authority, just as
the people’s obedience to the king was likewise understood as a natural extension of
their obedience to God. But in the 16th century all this begins to change.
For instance, we find as early as 1445 the Cortes of Olmedo announcing that it is
contrary to Divine Law to even touch the king, and in 1446 Aenaes Sylvius (1405-
1464) proclaims that “the emperor is independent and above the laws of the land” (as
cited in Lewis, 1954, p. 48). However, it is not until the political writings of William
Tyndale (1494-1536) that we begin to see a major movement away from the medieval
political outlook. We can see this movement of thought beginning in earnest when
Tyndale, who wanted to justify Henry’s political and spiritual authority, especially his
right to divorce, began challenging the medieval idea that the king’s office is
ultimately derived from the people and for the people. Instead, Tyndale suggests that
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it is actually God and not the common people who select the king (although God may
select the king through the people). This eventually led Tyndale to the conclusion
that since God ordains the king, “the king’s right is divine” and he is therefore
answerable only to God and not to the people. This idea can be clearly seen in
Tyndale’s Obedience of a Christian Man (1528). He writes: “The King is in this
world without law and may at his own lust do right and wrong and shall give accounts
to God only” (as cited in Lewis, 1954, p. 49).
In other words, insurrection even against a tyrannical king is forbidden under
Tyndale, since any rebellion (be it just or unjust) is ultimately a rebellion against
“God’s very chosen one,” and therefore against God himself. As a result, if the
people found themselves ruled by an unjust king (whose civil laws rebelled against
God’s Natural Laws) under this new political idea of sovereignty suggested by
Tyndale, there was but one road left open to the righteous man and that was not
rebellion, but rather martyrdom at the hands of an unjust king.
At first sight it would seem that this new political idea of the divine right of kings
(one that appears to liberate the king not only from the censure of the people, but also
from the natural law of the universe) promotes an outlook that actually works against
our own modernist scientific outlook of an impersonal universal law over-arching all
things and immutably controlling the processes of the natural world. However, the
final stroke of this new movement of thought was yet to come. Just when the
transition appears complete, it suddenly takes an unsuspecting turn in the political and
theological writings of Richard Hooker (1554-1600). In his Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity (1593) we find for the first time the idea that just as the king is under the law
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(for it is ultimately the law that makes him a king), God himself, although still the
creator of the natural law, also freely subjects himself under the requirements of the
natural law in order to be God. Thus, as Hooker explains, “They err who think that
the will of God to do this or that there is no reason besides his own perfect will” (as
cited in Lewis, 1954, p. 48). In other words, not even God acts above and apart from
the natural law that he creates. For it is only by means of this universal law of
righteousness, justice and goodness that God can be defined and understood as a
righteous, fair and loving being in the first place.
However, there is still one final step to take in this new political movement of
thought, and it was officially taken by the Humanist scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645). He suggests, “the Law of Nature, actually derived from God, would be
equally binding even if we supposed that no God existed” (as cited in Lewis, 1954, p.
49). Hence, we have for the first time the idea that even if God had no power to
enforce the natural law, the law would still have sovereign authority over all things.
This suggestion, though subtle as it may be, I believe opens the door to the idea of an
intrinsic universal law that can exist and operate without the necessity of a universal
“Law Giver.” This introduces the conceptual possibility of the existence of an
independent and impersonal natural law that overarches and controls all things. In
fact, we can find this idea already well developed as early as the next century in
Paley’s conception of a clockwork universe that is initially created by God, but then
left to “unwind” mechanically of its own accord.
In summary, if we consider the movements in learning, religion and politics that
have been discussed so far, I believe we can see at least three shifts leading away
81
from an organic integration with nature and toward a conceptual framework of
separation from nature. The first was the Humanist shift in language toward an
externalization of the natural world through a subtle but persistent emphasis on the
structural over the spontaneous, the formal over the functional, and the orderly over
the organic. It can also be seen in their aggressive promotion of a language structure
replete with words and concepts expressing the external “materialness” of the natural
world.
The second was a Puritanical shift toward dichotomization of the natural and the
rational, the spiritual and the physical, and the mind and the body. Also, this
movement strongly emphasized a kind of “mind over matter” approach to the
universe. The natural was to be no longer regarded as something to participate in, but
rather something to resist, rise above, and to be conquered by the spiritual and the
rational. Finally, the third was a shift toward a depersonalization of the natural world
through a political movement that emphasized an intrinsic natural law, one that not
only exercised an absolute authority over all things, but that existed not by order of
king or even by God himself, but as a distinct, impersonal part of the universe itself.
All of these forces, none of which were consciously directed at replacing the pre-
modern conception of the natural world, began to produce unconscious tension
between individuals and their perceived relationships with the natural world. Some
of these cultural forces of tension pushed inward; others pulled outward. The overall
effect appears to have been not the outright rejection of the older medieval framework
of unity and integration, but rather the emergence of new “condition of possibility”
for perceiving that organic world from a different conceptual point of view. In other
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words, each of these movements influenced the development of a new cultural “form
of life” for thinking, feeling and ultimately perceiving the pre-modern organic world
from a more disconnected framework of meaning. There is, however, one more area
of change where I believe we can see the influences of this new cultural form of life
influencing the Elizabethan’s perceptions of meaning. That is in the area of 16th
century science.
Mystical Science and the Loss of Hierarchy
Philosophy is odious and dark; Both Law and Physick for petty wits;
Divinity is the basest of the three…, Tis magic that hath ravished me
(Marlow, 1604, The Tragic History of Dr. Faustus)
Before describing some of the cultural movements that emerged in 16th century
science, it is important to note that, when I use the word science in this 16th century
context, I am referring to something very different from today’s definition of that
word. To be a scientist in the 16th century meant one of two things: either one was a
Naturalistic Philosopher or a Mystical Scientist. In our modern vernacular that means
either an Astrologer or a Magician.
The discourse of astrology during the 16th century needs little explanation. It is
practiced today in a form recognizable to the 16th century practitioner. The discourse
of magic however, is different. By the word magic, I do not mean anything like the
modern ideas of witchcraft, sorcery or rabbits in hats. I am referring rather to what
the 16th century Humanists called magia divina. This kind of “high magic” was
studied widely during this period and was publicly “avowed and vindicated by
eloquent scholars who drew much of their strength from the New Learning of the
Humanist” (Lewis, 1954, p. 7).
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This 16th century natural magic was therefore a serious endeavor practiced by
learned Humanist scholars who styled themselves as the heroic “revivers” of an
ancient and noble learning since lost to the barbaric and ignorant Schoolmen of the
Middle-Ages. In many ways, this ancient magia divina had been lost to the medieval
mind. There was certainly plenty of magic in the discourses of the medieval period.
But the tone of medieval magic (like the tone of the medieval asceticism already
described) was distinctly different from that pursued and practiced by 16th century
scientist. As Lewis explains:
In medieval stories there is, in one sense, plenty of magic. Merlin does this or
that by his subtlety, Bercilak resumes his severed head. But all these passages
have an unmistakable note of ‘faerie’ about them…But in Spenser, Marlow,
Chapman and Shakespeare the subject is treated quite differently: books are
opened, terrible words pronounced, souls imperiled. (Lewis, 1954, p. 8)
This new mystical science was a serious discipline that attempted to comprehend
and explain “the very frontiers of knowledge…concerning itself with a variety of
almost unimaginable problems of organization, complexity and harmony of nature”
(Boaz, 1962, p. 167). It was even considered by many to be a kind of holy work by
affording its initiates a unique and powerful glimpse into the deep mysteries of the
natural world. The humanist scholar Aggripa (1486-1535) refers to this in his De
Occulta Philosophia (1510):
Once by the judgment of all old philosophers Magic held the highest place of
honor, but from the first days of the Church it has been forbidden and
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denounced: most unjustly for it is a high holy learning. (as cited in Lewis
1954, p. 9)
The study of astrology, on the other hand, was another scientific pursuit that
flourished during this 16th century period. This tremendous resurgence of interest in
the astrological arts, much like the new interest in magia divina, appears to have been
motivated by the same rediscovery and interest in the ancient manuscripts of Greece
and Rome. In fact, this new interest was so strong during this period that many
astrologers not only lost entire family fortunes procuring new equipment and building
elaborate observatories, but some, in less enlightened segments of the continent, even
lost their lives pursuing their “subtle science” of the stars. Many of the founding
fathers of our own modern astronomy, including Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler and even
Galileo, were known to cast astrological horoscopes and predict calamities for their
patrons. Thus writes Fernel (1497-1558) regarding the strong allure that this interest
in astrology incited:
Contemplation of the stars and heavenly bodies excites such wonder and
charm in the human mind that, once fascinated by it, we are caught in the toils
of an enduring and delighted slavery, which holds us in bondage and serfdom.
(as cited in Boaz, 1962, p. 168)
This metaphor of “bondage and serfdom” is an appropriate description of the new
interest in astrology that emerged during this period. It highlights not only its
primary theoretical framework, but also how it differed philosophically from the
magical sciences. The contrast between the astrologer and the magician may seem to
be insignificant, especially to a modern observer who would be tempted to merely
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group both under the common heading of ancient superstitions. But for the 16th
century observer, the study of astrology and the study of magic actually represented
two scientific approaches that were diametrically opposed in their conceptual
outlooks.
That is because astrology is essentially deterministic in its outlook. Its main
emphasis is on nature’s power over the individual. It is therefore an approach that
emphasizes the individual’s integration and complete dependence on the stellar
movements of the heavenly bodies. The study of magic, on the other hand, is
conceptually nondeterministic. It strongly emphasizes the individual’s power over
nature and subsequent freedom to create and determine his or her own destiny. The
important point is that, like astrology, the study of magic was a scientific approach
strongly grounded in the medieval microcosm-macrocosm intellectual tradition. The
main difference is that the study of magic primarily emphasized the macrocosms
embeddedness within the individual, whereas the new cultural movements in
astrology tended to emphasize the individual’s embeddedness within the macrocosm.
Examples of this conceptual difference between magic and astrology can be seen in
many of the writings from both groups. For instance, Pomponatius (1462-1524), an
ardent astrologer, believed that all things in the universe were ultimately determined
by “Constellation” and that man himself was only “related to the world as an image in
a mirror is related to a real object…and can know himself no more than a mirror
image can know itself” (as cited from Lewis, 1954, p. 14). However, in the mystical
writings of the Neo-Platonist Giovanni Mirandola (1463-1494) we find:
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To thee, oh Adam, we have given thee no certain habitation nor countenance
of thine own neither any peculiar office, so that what habitation or
countenance or office you so ever choose for thyself, the same thou shalt
enjoy and posses at thine own proper will and election. Thy was made neither
a thing celestial nor a thing terrestrial, neither mortal nor immortal, so that
being thine own fashioner and artificer of thyself, thou may make thyself after
what likeness thou dost most affect. (Mirandola, 1996, p. 3)
This is important because, in both cases, we find a sharp departure from the earlier
medieval conception of hierarchy. Under this medieval outlook, it was generally
believed that degrees of order and value were not only objectively present in the
universe, but also that all things (except God himself) had a natural superior as well
as a natural inferior. It was also believed that the happiness of all created beings
consisted chiefly in fulfilling their proper position in the “natural order” of things by
submitting in obedience to their natural superiors and ruling justly their natural
inferiors.
To overlook this medieval conception of hierarchy is to almost overlook the
Middle-Ages itself. It was part of the very life-blood that flowed through the
medieval perspective. It also explains much of our modern confusion regarding the
medieval period in general. For instance, when Henry VII ordered the death of his
dogs that had baited a lion, or when he had his own hawk decapitated for fighting
with an eagle, we must not forget that he was acting in strict accord with the medieval
conception of hierarchy. However, these two new scientific cultural movements were
about to change this medieval conception.
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Under the medieval hierarchy every individual was bequeathed a limited degree of
power to rule and serve within the framework of the natural order. However, under
the new emphasis of astrology, the stellar movements of the heavens were now seen
to control the individual completely. In an equal and opposite direction, the new
emphasis of magic afforded the individual with an almost unlimited power over all
things in the natural universe. This movement away from hierarchy, natural order
and a balance of power within the universe, I believe, created a new dynamic within
the medieval microcosm-macrocosm relationship.
By rebelling against the framework of hierarchy, the conceptually antagonistic
cultural forces of astrology and magic created, not a rift, but rather a subtle new
tension within the medieval framework of integration. The overall effect appears to
have been one that created an extreme push of the medieval universe inward toward
the omnipotence of the individual through magic, and an equal and opposite pull
outward toward the impotence of the individual through astrology. This sort of
simultaneous contraction and expansion was not strong enough to consciously rip the
medieval universe apart, since neither of the new sciences actually violated the
microcosm-macrocosm relationship. Rather, they garnered their individual strengths
from the relationship. However, I do believe that this conceptual push/pull tension
was persistent enough to begin unconsciously undermining the conceptual
foundations of the medieval organic perspective.
Finally, the subtle, even unconscious shift in the medieval outlook that may have
been influenced by these cultural-historical movements might also explain the
relatively surprising and unforeseen historical direction this shift appears to have
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taken. Unlike the empirical explanation that merely presupposes itself, this more
genealogical explanation actually supports the historical evidence as we find it toward
the end of the 16th century. It would also help explain why the kind of scientific
discourse that actually emerged out of the cultural-historical context of the 16th
century was in many respects unlike the kind of science consciously pursued during
the period.
The strongly Neo-Platonic flavor of the Humanistic movement was not only
largely hostile toward the practice of science in general, but was also expected to
promote an increase in the mystical aspects of natural science. This is precisely what
we do find during this period with the sudden burst of new interest in the magical and
astrological sciences. If we consider the overall tone and tenor of this historical
period then, especially given the Humanistic infatuation with the rediscovered ancient
manuscripts, one would have expected to see a deeper and more profound entrance
into the medieval conceptual framework of unity, participation and integration with
nature.
However, what we find emerging toward the end of this period is something
altogether different. What we see is more of a movement away from the integrated
microcosm-macrocosm framework of meaning and the beginnings of our own
modernist context of separation and division from nature. Moreover, there is little
evidence in the discourses of the period to suggest that a rational, conscious decision
was made to suddenly abandon the 2000-year-old microcosm-macrocosm framework
of meaning and to begin pursuing a more mechanistic-mathematical approach. What
we do find, however, is a kind of oblique, even unconscious shifting of the entire
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social framework of language surrounding certain words and ideas that had
previously been used to describe the world from a context of integration.
This change from a context of integration with nature to one emphasizing a
separation from nature, I believe, supports the idea that the conceptual change that
emerged during the Scientific Revolution was less a conscious empirical decision and
more an unconscious cultural persuasion for people to begin thinking and feeling
about the world from a new context of meaning. In other words, what emerged
toward the end of the 16th century, at least as evidenced from the discourses, appears
to have been a shift in meaning that was less like a conscious scientific revolution and
more like an unconscious cultural evolution.
So, instead of assuming, as our modernist empirical discourses would have us
believe, that the rich intellectual tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas was
finally challenged, exposed and proven wrong by the enlightened empirical minds of
the Scientific Revolution, this genealogical explanation suggests that this conceptual
shift may have been less of a reformation and more of a re-conceptualization of the
medieval integrated outlook into a new modernist framework of separation and
division. This would help explain Barfield’s comments that:
Astrology has changed into astronomy, alchemy to chemistry, today the cold
stars glitter unapproachable overhead, and with a naïve detachment mind
watches matter moving incomprehensibly in the void. At last, after four
centuries, thought has shaken herself free. (Barfield, 1973, p. 143)
Therefore, by encouraging a delicate shift in the social context toward an
externalization, dichotomization, and depersonalization of the natural world, the new
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educational, religious, political and scientific cultural movements of the Scientific
Revolution, I believe, created a new “condition of possibility” for the production of a
new scientific form of discourse. With it, a new conceptual framework of meaning
was created that continues to divide us from our own rational, emotional and spiritual
participation in the natural world.
This chapter examined some of the aspects related to why modern humans have
become so divided in their perceptions of the natural world. It also explored some of
the major factors that may have influenced this division. An archeological
examination of how discourse evolved and changed during the historical period
surrounding the Scientific Revolution was presented. This examination began with a
brief overview of the literary archive just prior to the beginning of the 16th century.
It was concluded through this investigation that the primary emphasis of the
discourses during this late medieval period was one that essentially expressed an
intrinsic microcosm-macrocosm relationship between humans and their natural world.
The focus then shifted to an exploration of the literary archive toward the end of
the 16th century. Attention was especially given to how such concepts as
mathematics, scientific hypotheses and mechanism began shifting away from their
earlier medieval meanings of integration with nature and toward a more modernist
framework of division and separation from nature.
Then, a genealogical examination of the cultural-historical context surrounding the
Scientific Revolution was discussed. The focus of this examination was to identify
and describe how certain cultural movements operating during this period might have
influenced a shift from an earlier microcosm-macrocosm context of meaning to a
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more modern material mechanistic context of meaning. Four primary cultural
movements were identified and discussed as possible factors that may have
influenced a shift in the social context toward externalization, depersonalization, and
dichotomization of humans and their natural world.
It was also concluded in this chapter that the shift in discourse that emerged as a
result of these cultural movements appears to contradict the kind of shift one might
expect for this period, given that the general trend appears to have been moving
toward a deeper enhancement of the microcosm-macrocosm relationship instead of its
ultimate abolition. Finally, it was suggested that the new scientific relationship that
began emerging toward the end of the 16th century appears to have been the same
earlier microcosm-macrocosm relationship, only seen and expressed through a new
conceptual lens of separation and division.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary
limitation, into a practical critique that takes the form of possible transgression.
(Foucault, 1984, What is Enlightenment?)
This study has endeavored to explore some of the various aspects related to why
humans today are so divided in their perceptions of the natural world. In chapter one,
I described how modernist science appears to be a discourse that divides us
externally, socially and internally from our world. It was also suggested that this
perceptual division might be related to how modern humans have learned to
conceptualize their world through our modern educational system, and that education
might itself be one of the primary means by which we can begin reconnecting our
fragmented lives.
In chapter two I introduced a theoretical lens for considering how concepts,
language, culture and history may influence our perceptions of meaning. This
theoretical lens emphasized the relationship that appears to exist between our
perceptions of meaning and concepts, between concepts and language, and between
language and the unique cultural-historical context from which it ultimately derives
its meanings.
In chapter three I identified and described the methodological approach to be used
in exploring the research questions outlined in chapter one. This included a brief
description of Michael Foucault’s Historical Analytical approach, focusing mainly on
his archeological and genealogical techniques for exploring how our perceptions of
meaning evolve and change over time as a function of discourse, culture and history.
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In chapter four, I began exploring my first research question related to why modern
humans have become so perceptually divided from our world. The main focus of this
examination was to identify and explain how discourse describing the natural world
may have altered its form during the historical period surrounding the Scientific
Revolution. It was concluded that, toward the end of the 16th century, there appears
to have been a shift away from a pre-modern microcosm-macrocosm form of
discourse toward a more modern material-mechanistic form of discourse. It was also
suggested that this break in the smooth flow of discourse carried with it a change in
the conceptual framework of meaning from one emphasizing integration with nature
to one emphasizing division and separation from nature.
The second part of chapter four focused on a genealogical examination of some of
the possible cultural factors that may have influenced this shift in discourse. The
main purpose of this examination was to identify and describe how certain cultural
movements that arose during the period surrounding the Scientific Revolution may
have subtly, even unconsciously, created a new “condition of possibility” for the
emergence of our own modernist scientific form of discourse. It was suggested that
specific movements of thought in the traditions of learning, religion, politics and
science may have encouraged a new social context for the externalization,
depersonalization and dichotomization of humans and their natural world.
The purpose of this final chapter will be to explore some of the possible
educational implications of this study. This chapter will be divided into two main
sections. The first section will examine how our modernist scientific framework of a
separation from nature might be promoted and sustained through contemporary
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education. Specifically, this section will explore how the modernist curriculum may
function as a primary form of discourse for the promotion of an empirical framework
of meaning: one that ultimately encourages a conceptual division between humans
and their knowledge of the world. The last section of the chapter will explore some
of the inherent problems associated with the modernist curricular discourse and
propose three broad conceptual approaches for expanding our future curricular
discourses into a more comprehensive framework of meaning.
The Modernist Curriculum as a Discourse of Separation
    	

:
They kill us in broad daylight!
(Homer, 628 BC, The Iliad)
In chapter four I suggested that toward the end of the 16th century, certain cultural-
historical factors began influencing the primary forms of discourse through which
many perceived themselves in relation to their natural world. It was also suggested
that this shift in discourse carried with it a conceptual change that ultimately
encouraged a movement away from a pre-modern framework of integration with
nature to our own modern framework of division and separation from nature.
How then, it might be asked, is this modernist framework of separation
represented and promoted in our culture today? Some believe that one of the primary
places we can find this framework of meaning being promoted is in our own modern
educational system. For instance, Bortoft comments on the role of contemporary
education in promoting our modernist scientific framework:
In our technical-scientific culture we have specialized in the development of
only one mode of consciousness, to which our educational system is geared
almost exclusively. This is the analytical mode of consciousness, which
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develops in conjunction with our experience of perceiving and manipulating
solid bodies. The internalization of our experience of the closed boundaries of
such bodies leads to a way of thinking which naturally emphasizes distinction
and separation. (Bortoft, 1996, p.61)
This “analytical mode of consciousness,” I believe, directly corresponds with the
quantitative mode of perception discussed in chapter four in that both assume a
conceptual framework of separation between the knower and the known. As a result,
both approaches share a strong conceptual affinity with the empirical discourse
promoted under Descartes, since each conceptualizes the natural world as an
extrinsically divided environment of independent material objects. This empirically
divided, non-participatory view of the natural world is precisely the conceptual
outlook Bortoft describes as being “alive and well in the teaching of science in
schools and colleges, often hiding implicitly in the way that science is taught”
(Bortoft, 1996, p. 145).
Cultural historian Thomas Kuhn also recognized the role our educational system
appears to play in promoting a conceptual framework of meaning. In fact, Kuhn
believed formal education was largely a process of conceptual indoctrination, where
the individual student was systematically initiated into the intellectual traditions of a
particular worldview or paradigm. He explains:
At least in the mature sciences, answers to questions are firmly embedded in
the educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for
professional practice. Because education is both rigorous and rigid, these
answers come to exert a deep hold on the scientific mind…a strenuous and
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devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by
professional education. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 5)
If education is an institutionalized attempt to conform our understanding of the
world into a particular worldview, how exactly are the “conceptual boxes” of our own
modernist worldview represented and expressed in education today? Educator Jayne
Fleener believes the concepts of our modernist worldview are promulgated through
the modernist curriculum, since it is the curriculum that ultimately represents the very
“heart of schooling,” and the primary forms of discourse that give the educational
process its conceptual “life and meaning” (Fleener, 2002, p. 175). Educator Bill Doll
also implicates the modernist curriculum as representing “the very heart of our
traditional, modernist concepts and epistemology” (Doll, 1993, p. 125).
It would appear, then, that it is largely through the language structures of our
modernist curricular discourses that the natural world is conceptually divided and
quantified into an externalized, empirical world of inner and outer, mind and body,
and observer and observed. We can see this empirical framework of separation
working intrinsically on the modernist curriculum with its fragmentation of such
things as objectives and outcomes, teachers and learners, and the knower and the
known. Doll (1993) recognized how the modernist curriculum:
…falsely separates the knower from the known in its desire to create a
transcendent objective. And in this view of knowledge, to which we are mere
spectators, lies the view of curriculum formalized in Ralph Tyler’s rationale.
(p. 125)
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In his book the Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (1950), the
American educator Ralph Tyler (1928-1994) developed one of the primary forms of
curricular discourse that continues to dominate our modern educational landscape.
This Tyler discourse is essentially one that promotes an empirical outlook of the
world by placing a strong conceptual emphasis on such practices as the development
of predetermined learning objectives, the linear organization of curricular content,
and the use of mathematics as a primary means for measuring and evaluating learning
success. It is therefore an approach that not only negates our cognitive participation
in structuring our knowledge of the world, but appears to do so by representing that
knowledge as an objective “subject material” that can be perceived and transmitted in
a linear fashion from the teacher to the student. Thus explains Sears and Marshall
(1990) when summarizing the Tyler approach to learning:
Goals and objectives are predetermined, content is selected and logically
organized, often in the form of a textbook; teachers are trained to present it
efficiently; and student learning is objectively measured as to a way to
determine the effectiveness of the curriculum. (p. 34)
As such, the Tyler curricular discourse is one that ultimately promotes a
quantitative, linear, reductive conception of the natural world where the knower and
the known are divided into a metaphysical dualism of passive spectator and
objectified world of meaning. Even the teacher under the Tyler discourse assumes a
uniquely empirical role as the privileged “keeper of knowledge.” Since it is also
assumed under this discourse that the students will only learn that which the teacher
disseminates, careful adherence and conformance to the subject matter of the
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curriculum is persistently emphasized. This linear flow of knowledge from teacher to
student, from external world to internal mind, and from curriculum to learner is an
example of what Posner (1998) describes as the “production” conception of
modernist education:
Schooling is assumed to be a process whose main purpose is to promote or
produce learning. Students are termed learners; objectives are conceived in
terms of desirable learning; evaluation of the schools’ success is targeted
almost exclusively on achievement test scores; ‘educational’ goals are
distinguished from ‘non-educational’ goals by determining if they can be
attributed to learning; ‘curriculum’ is defined…in terms of ‘intended learner
outcomes.’ Thus, schooling is perceived as a production system, in which
individual learning outcomes are the primary product. (as cited in Fleener,
2002, p. 16)
Any deviations from these “primary products” of knowledge, especially into the
vague areas of personal interpretation and inter-subjectivity, are considered under the
Tyler discourse as an unproductive waste of valuable educational time. As a result,
the personal, contextual, and even cultural-historical aspects of our knowledge and
perceptions of the world are ultimately dismissed as either a secondary concern or
completely inconsequential.
This “non-participatory” approach to knowledge is one of the distinguishing
characteristics linking the Tyler discourse with the empirical discourses of Descartes.
According to Descartes, the attainment of any true and lasting knowledge of the
world requires that learners:
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…first purify themselves of all bias, perspective, and emotional attachment
which could only be achieved through a transcendence of body and all of its
distractions, which serve only to obscure thought. (Dempsey & Butkus, 1999,
p. 33)
Such a “value free” approach to our knowledge of the world unfortunately has an
inveterate tendency for dichotomizing our perceptions of meaning into dualistic
modes of reality: one consisting of objective abstractions like number, magnitude and
position; and one consisting of subjective experiences like colors, tastes and sounds.
This positivistic division between the objective and the subjective, the prosaic and
poetic, and the mind and the body not only obscures our cognitive participation in
knowing the world but also promotes a conceptual outlook that ultimately sees the
world as an externalized raw material that must first be quantified, measured, and
reduced before it can ever be known.
By promoting an empirical conception of knowledge with its inherent separation
between the knower and the known, the Tyler curricular discourse essentially divides
us conceptually from our cognitive, emotional, and even physical participation in the
natural world. That is because, as the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus (1266-
1308) pointed out long ago, “the knowledge of the things that are, is the things
themselves” (as cited in Lindberg, 1992, p.188). In other words, by conceptually
separating us from our knowledge of the world, the Tyler curricular discourse
effectively separates us from the world itself.
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Expanding our Modern Curricular Discourse
There are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths.
It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil.
(A.N. Whitehead, 1925, Science and the Modern World)
How might we begin changing our modernist curricular discourse into a form less
fragmented and divided as a whole? Postmodern educators Swimme and Berry
(1992) suggests expanding our curricular discourses into a more comprehensive
framework of meaning that encourages individual humans to “fulfill their proper role
in their larger pattern of meaning…we can understand this role in the Great Story
only if we know the story in its full dimensions” (Swimme & Berry, 1992, p. 256).
This implies that what is needed is not necessarily an escape from the present
modernist conceptual framework of separation, but rather a new way for finding a
deeper entrance into the fuller dimension of the “Great Story” of meaning. And this,
I am convinced, should involve not merely the outright rejection of our modernist
framework of separation and division, but rather an attempt to find how this
framework might fit into the “larger pattern of meaning.” In fact, this strong desire
for thinking that one meaning must first be rejected in order to receive another is
really only another “habit of thought” promoted by a narrowly conceived modernist
discourse of empiricism. Educator Parker Palmer (1998) believes this habit is driven
by our “Western commitment to thinking in polarities, a thought form that elevates
disconnection into an intellectual virtue…This way of thinking is so embedded in our
culture that we rarely escape it, even when we try” (p. 61).
How can our modernist curricular discourse be expanded into a more
comprehensive framework that does not merely reject one meaning for another, but
rather seeks to embrace a deeper understanding of the world as a whole? In exploring
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this question I will propose three broad conceptual approaches. The first will
recommend a conceptual approach based on the work presented in this study by
encouraging a more participative approach to seeing meaning not merely differently,
but more comprehensively as a whole. The second approach aims at the development
of an historical consciousness within curricular discourse. The third approach
recommends creation of a context for embracing both linear and nonlinear meanings
by using language as an example for understanding the natural world as a living
discourse of meaning.
I will remain intentionally broad and pedagogically nonspecific in the next three
sections. My overall purpose is to address the educational implications of this study
at the conceptual level of meaning instead of the pedagogical level of practice.
However, many notable authors (Applebee, 1996; Doll, 1996; Greene, 2000; Fleener,
2002; Miller, 2000; Noddings, 1992 and Palmer, 1998) have already identified and
developed many pedagogical methods for expanding our modern curricular discourse
into a broader context of meaning. One of the main goals of this study has been to
explore how concepts, language, culture and history influence perceptions of
meaning. My final section will therefore focus on how these same interrelated factors
might be used as a kind of “conceptual scaffolding” for reconnecting our fragmented
perceptions of meaning through the process of education.
The Curriculum and “Seeing Comprehensively”
The true illusion celebrate, be joyful in this serious game
No living thing lives separate; for One and Many are the same.
(Goethe, 1821, Epirrhema)
In describing some of the difficulties inherent to the modernist conceptual outlook,
Parker Palmer describes how a commitment to thinking in polarities precludes the
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ability to “hold the tension of opposites” (Palmer, 1998, p. 83) and embrace the
beauty and depth of paradox. The idea of paradox is an important metaphor for
considering how to begin expanding our modernist curricular discourse into a broader
context of meaning. Instead of promoting positivistic polarity, the experience of
paradox actually encourages conceptual contemplation of vastly different meanings at
the same time:
Paradoxical thinking requires that we embrace a view of the world in which
opposites are joined, so that we can see the world clearly and see it whole.
Such a view is characterized by neither flinty-eyed realism nor dewy-eyed
romanticism but rather by a creative synthesis of the two. (Palmer, 1998, p.
66)
This simultaneous consideration of seemingly inconsistent meanings is what
creates the tension of paradox. As such, the experience of paradox provides a unique
opportunity for experiencing more meaning as opposed to just different meaning.
Instead of merely alternating between meanings in a liner fashion, when we embrace
the tension of opposites revealed through the experience of a paradox we are actually
allowing ourselves to hold, at least as long as the experience lasts, vastly different
meanings simultaneously. Barfield describes this sort of simultaneous seeing of
different meanings at the same time as the faculty of “double vision,” where the
synthetic imagination concurrently reconnects into a unity that the analytical intellect
is perpetually reducing into separation and distinction:
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Imagination, in fact, presupposes double vision and not simply the substitution
of one kind of single vision for another. It requires a sober ability to have the
thing both ways at once. (Barfield, 1977, p. 123)
This dynamic interplay between the analytical intellect and synthetic imagination
allows us to simultaneously embrace the unique aspects of diversity and unity by
perceiving them together as a comprehensive harmony of differences. Goethe
referred to this “two-fold” seeing as the ability to perceive “multiplicity in unity”
where the “the single phenomenon becomes, as it were, one larger phenomena,” and
the imagination overcomes the isolation of the intellects single observations, and in so
doing, accomplishes “a transition into a higher level of experience” (as cited in
Bortoft, 1996, p. 291).
This approach to meaning is obviously very different from our modernist approach
that not only overemphasizes the analytical intellect’s role in dividing and separating
meaning, but also obscures the imagination’s role for integrating meaning into a
single unity. This explains why our perceptions of meaning become so one-sided and
fragmented. However, seeing meaning from a context of “multiplicity in unity”
allows the analytical intellect to distinguish between different colors and textures of
meaning without ever allowing those meanings to become isolated and fragmented in
their distinction.
This kind of mental breathing between analysis and synthesis is what Bortoft
describes as an example of seeing meaning “more comprehensively” as opposed to
merely seeing it differently as an either-or proposition. The process of seeing
comprehensively is a conscious attempt to allow the analytical intellect to apprehend
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the separateness of distinct meanings, while at the same time, allowing the synthetic
imagination to apprehend their interrelationship and togetherness within the broader
context of the “Great Story” of meaning.
It should also be emphasized here that seeing comprehensively is in no way an
attempt to assimilate different meanings into a kind of neutral relationship where each
is blended generically into a lukewarm compromise of meaning. Rather, seeing
comprehensively is a conceptual approach that seeks to accentuate not amalgamate
different aspects of meanings by allowing each to remain brilliantly divided and
wonderfully related at the same time. A good example of this might be seen in the
distinctions of meaning that this study highlighted between the modernist framework
of separation from nature and the pre-modern framework of integration with nature.
Instead of seeing these two frameworks of meaning as competitive and therefore
incommensurable in nature, under this new approach, both perspectives can now be
embraced as a unique and valuable insight into a more comprehensive understanding
of the natural world.
Instead of promoting a complete abandonment of one conceptual framework for
the wholesale acceptance of another, as in Merchant’s call for “a total transformation
in science and worldviews that will replace the mechanistic framework with an
ecological framework” (Merchant, 1992, p. 11), there is an invitation to embrace
these vastly different conceptual frameworks simultaneously as completely valid
modes for “illuminating” a different aspect of the same natural world. Seeing
comprehensively actually provides a conceptual context for holding the tension
between the unmitigated strength of a “dewy-eyed” romantic perception of the natural
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world, and the full vigor of a coolly rational, “flinty-eyed” perception without
sacrificing the unique perspective of either.
If we are to begin expanding modernist curricular discourse into a form that is
more conducive to seeing the world, not merely differently, but more
comprehensively, I believe we must begin by promoting a form of curricular
discourse that essentially sees our world paradoxically: that is to say, as a world
incredibly diverse and deeply integrated at the same time. By always insisting on one
conceptual framework at the exclusion of another, I believe we may be in danger of
losing our intellectual-imaginative “double vision.” In that loss we risk becoming, as
Wittgenstein says, “aspect blind,” by falling prey to the same mistake the poet
William Blake (1757-1827) warned us against when writing “may God us keep, from
single vision and Newton’s sleep” (Blake, 1996, p. 85).
By learning to hold the tension between the intellect and the imagination we allow
ourselves to begin participating in what Goethe described as the “eternal systole and
diastole, the eternal synkrisis and diakrisis, the breathing in and out of the world in
which we move and have our being” (Naydler, 1996, p. 52). Unless we can begin
overcoming our current modernist aspect blindness for thinking in polarities, and for
approaching our natural world as an “endless series of either-ors” (Palmer, 1998, p.
62), it is difficult to see how we can begin expanding current curricular discourses
into a form that is more conducive to reading the “Great Story” in its fuller dimension
of meaning.
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The Curriculum and Developing a “ Historical Consciousness”
The modern person invents new ideals because they dare not attempt old ideals. They
look forward to the future, because they are afraid to look back at the past
(Chesterton, 1910, What’s Wrong with the World?)
Another recommendation for expanding modernist curricular discourse into a more
comprehensive context of meaning can be seen in a concept similar to that of
paradox: the idea of growth. Like the paradox, the concept of growth is an example
of augmentation as opposed to mere alteration. This can be seen, for instance, in
Whitehead’s (1824-1947) description of growth as the rhythm that exists between
change and permanence, or “the continual process of preserving order amid change,
and preserving change amid order” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 339). This continual
“rhythmic breathing” between change and permanence is what distinguishes growth
from mere change or alteration, in that change seeks to vacillate between differences,
whereas growth seeks to find a unity within difference. This explains why a tree
grows by adding rings and not by merely replacing one ring with another. It also
explains why growth is more than just the mere absorption or assimilation of one
thing into another. Where there is no distinction and separateness there can be no
unity, no harmonizing of differences, and therefore no “preserving of order amid
change.”
Capra (1996) refers to this same rhythmic relationship of persevering order amid
change when he describes the concept of autopoeisis. According to Capra,
autopoeisis is the organic process where each individual component within a living
network “participates in the production or transformation of other components in the
network. In this way the entire network continually makes itself ” (Capra, 1996, p.
98). This perennial transformation and renewal of a living system through the
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continual readjustment of the individual components within the system is not a unique
concept today, but is an idea that Goethe indirectly referred to over two centuries ago
when describing the dynamic characteristics of all living things:
…the basic characteristic of an individual organism: to divide, to unite, to
merge, into the universal, to abide in the particular, to transform itself, to
define its, and, as living things tend to appear under a thousand conditions, to
arise and vanish, to solidify and melt, to freeze and flow, to expand and
contract. Since these effects occur together, any or all may occur at the same
moment. Genesis and decay, creation and destruction, birth and death, joy
and pain, all are interwoven with equal effect and weight; thus even the most
isolated event always presents itself as an image and metaphor for the most
universal. (Naydler, 1996, p. 52)
How might this fluid framework of growth and autopoietic transformation be
related to expanding our modernist curricular discourse into a more comprehensive
framework of meaning? One possible approach might be seen in the unique way that
an autopoeitic system uses feedback loops of communication to continually adjust
itself in order to “correct mistakes, regulate, and self-organize itself” (Capra, 1996, p.
83). The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998) has suggested that
autopoietic feedback networks can extend themselves into the social domain of living
things, such as when “social systems use communication as their primary mode of
autopoietic reproduction” to expand, adjust, and transform their context of meaning
(as cited in Capra, 1996, p. 212).
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This implies that a social system can continually recreate itself by using meanings
gleaned from the past to adjust, modify and structurally reproduce a more
comprehensive understanding of the present. As such, this newly integrated meaning
that emerges from the dynamic interrelationship of both past and present is
autopoietic in that neither of the original meanings are completely replaced or
assimilated by the other. Each is “recast” and transformed into a broader context of
togetherness. Dewey (1859-1952) refers to a similar adjustment of past and present
meanings when describing how the imagination can serve as “the gateway through
which meanings derived from past experiences find their way into the present; it is
the conscious adjustment of the new and the old” (Dewey, 1980, p. 272).
Doll also refers to a similar autopoietic process of consciously adjusting the new
and the old when describing the process of recursion. According to Doll, it is
through recursion that past and present meanings are allowed to “loop back upon
themselves” to transform and enhance our understanding of the world. It is also the
primary means by which we become conscious of ourselves as distinct beings
existing within a particular framework of time:
In recursion, reflection plays a positive role; for thoughts to leap back on
themselves, as in Dewey’s secondary experience reflecting back on primary
experience, or in Piaget’s reflexive intelligence reflecting back on practical
intelligence, it is necessary, as Bruner has said, to step back from one’s
doings, to distance oneself in some way’ from one’s own thoughts. (Doll,
1993, p. 178)
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Without this essential “distancing of oneself” that comes from casting our
experiences against a backdrop of history, there can be no looping of thoughts back
on themselves, no conscious adjustment of new and old, and therefore no autopoietic
transformation of meaning. That is because the more completely a past experience
has been “left behind,” the more thoroughly it is at the disposal of our imaginative
powers to be reorganized, reconnected and recast into a more comprehensive context
for understanding the present. Thus Greene explains:
…meaning derived from previous experiences find their way through the
gateway of the imagination to interact with present-day experiences. When
aspects of the present are infused by materials originating in the past there is
always a re-viewing of the past, even as the new experience (enriched now)
comes to consciousness. (Greene, 2000, p. 76)
One possible way that this recursive power might help expand our modernist
curricular discourses is by encouraging what Foucault refers to as the development of
a “historical consciousness.” Without this contextual understanding of the past, we
simply limit our ability to understand why we think and feel as we do in the present.
Nor could we begin to see (as this study has endeavored to show) the seemingly
contingent nature of our present knowledge of the world as it is cognitively and
socially constituted within a unique cultural-historical context of meaning. Lewis
communicates a similar belief when addressing the importance of developing an
“intimate knowledge of the past” in education:
We need to develop an intimate knowledge of the past. Not that the past has
any magic about it, but because we cannot study the future, and yet need
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something to set against the present, to remind us that the basic assumptions
have been quite different in different periods…A man who has lived in many
places in not likely to be deceived by the local errors of his native village: the
scholar has lived in many times and is therefore in some degree immune from
the great cataract of nonsense that pours from the press and the microphone of
his own age. (Lewis, 2001, pp. 28-29)
To neglect the development of this historical consciousness from future curricular
discourses would be to effectively preclude seeing, as Goethe did over 200 years ago,
that “the history of science is science itself” (Goethe, 1971, preface). The
development of a historical consciousness can also help reveal the contingent nature
of modernist intellectual traditions by seeing that:
…all the traditions that surround us; those of architecture, agriculture,
engineering, the arts, religion, history, science, mathematics, literature…are
traditions of knowledge-in-action, deeply contextualized ways of participating
in the world of the present. (Applebee, 1996, p. 2)
Such a historical awareness not only creates a more comprehensive context for
understanding the present, it also affords, as Foucault describes, a unique ability for
“straying afield” by realizing the contextual nature of all intellectual traditions. That
is because it is through the development of a historical consciousness that we begin to
realize that no matter how monolithic its foundations may appear, no matter how
rigorously it is promoted through the various social modes of discourse, all
knowledge regardless of its form is ultimately influenced by the unique cultural-
historical context in which it is embedded. Therefore, by encouraging the
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development a historical consciousness in our curricular discourses we are in essence
encouraging a strong tincture of personal insight and intellectual freedom that comes
from the dynamic process:
…of leaving something behind while reaching toward something new…A
reflective grasp of our life stories and of our ongoing quests that reaches
beyond where we have been, depends on our ability to remember things past.
It is against the backdrop of those remembered things and the funded
meanings to which they gave rise, that we grasp and understand what is now
going on around us. (Greene, 2000, p. 20)
The Curriculum and “Reading Nature” as Discourse
I see,’ she said at last, thoughtfully. I see now…The further up and the further in you
go, the bigger everything gets. The inside is larger than the outside.
(Lewis, 1956, The Last Battle)
Finally, there is one more conceptual approach that I will recommend for
expanding modernist curricular discourses into a more comprehensive framework of
meaning: the concept of the whole itself. In his book The Web of Life, Capra
identifies two opposing conceptions of the whole when he writes:
The basic tension is one between the parts and the whole. The emphasis on
the parts has been called mechanistic, reductionistic, or atomistic: the
emphasis on the whole has been called holistic, organismic, or ecological.
(Capra, 1996, p. 17)
The relationship between the parts and the whole for the mechanistic perspective is
essentially one that sees the whole as a product arising from the sum of the individual
parts, as those parts are added together in a linear fashion. We can observe this linear
aspect primarily in how the parts add up to the whole inductively, as well as in how
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the whole can be reduced back down to the individual parts in a deductive fashion.
This linear conception of the whole is ultimately one that emphasizes a positivistic
division between the parts and the whole.
The relationship between the parts and the whole under the organic approach is
somewhat different. Instead of seeing the whole as arising linearly from the
accumulation of the individual parts, the organic, or systems perspective sees the
meaning of the parts and the meaning of the whole as being joined together into a
kind of an inseparable unity. As Capra explains:
The great shock of twentieth-century science has been that systems cannot be
understood by analysis. The properties of the parts are not intrinsic properties
but can be understood only within the context of the larger whole. Thus the
relationship between the parts and the whole has been reversed. In the
systems approach the properties of the parts can be understood only from the
organization of the whole…Systems thinking then is ‘contextual’ which is the
opposite of analytical thinking. Analysis means taking something apart in
order to understand it; systems thinking means putting it into the context of a
larger whole. (Capra, 1996, p. 29-30)
So instead of the parts just adding themselves up quantitatively into a kind of
composite whole, under the systems conception the parts are conceived as being
arranged into a kind of “nested relationship” that actually transcends the mere
accumulation of the individual parts. In short, the linear conception sees the whole as
a product built up from the summing of the parts, whereas the systems conception is
nonlinear in that it sees the whole as being already immanent within the parts.
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I believe a good example of this nonlinear conception of the whole can be
suggested through the example of a hologram. Holograms are a special kind of
image produced on a photographic plate using a fine beam of light. What makes the
holographic image unique is its pervasiveness throughout the plate. For instance, if
the hologram plate is broken into fragments, each fragment will still retain a complete
copy of the original image. The only difference between the images is that
fragment’s resolution of the completed image is a little less well defined than before.
The important point to remember however is that each individual part or fragment of
the entire image still contains, within itself a complete image of the original whole.
Goethe referred to this kind of holographic “nested wholeness” as an example of
“unfolding of enfolding” where the image of the whole is enfolded within each of the
individual parts, and where each of the individual parts unfold more and more of the
whole as they come together into a unity. Goethe explains:
Nothing is more consonant with Nature than that she puts into operation in the
smallest detail that which she intends as a whole…And if you would seek
comfort in the whole, you must learn to discover the whole in the smallest
part. (as cited in Naydler, 1996, p. 59)
This idea of the unfolding of the whole that is already enfolded in the parts, I
believe, is a powerful image for considering how to begin expanding modernist
curricular discourse into a more comprehensive framework of meaning. For instance,
when describing our relationship with language and meaning, Bortoft refers to the
paradox of the “hermeneutic circle” in language, which basically states “that in order
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to read an author we have to understand him first, and yet we have to read him first in
order to understand him” (Bortoft, 1996, p. 7).
This linguistic paradox arises only insofar as we subscribe to an exclusively linear
understanding of the meaning of language. As long as we regard the meaning of
language as arising inductively from words to sentence or else deductively from
sentence to words, the paradox of the hermeneutical circle becomes logically
insoluble. However, if we consider actual experiences with language in reading,
writing, speaking and listening to others, what we find is something altogether
different. We find the meanings we discern from language emerge, not linearly as an
accumulation, but holistically as an “unfolding of enfolding.” As Bortoft explains:
…we do not have to store up what is read until it is all collected together,
whereupon we suddenly see the meaning all at once in an instant. On the
contrary, the meaning of the text is discerned and disclosed with progressive
immanence throughout the reading of the text. (Bortoft, 1996, p. 7)
This “progressive immanence” of meaning is not only revealed holistically as we
participate with the text, but it is another good example of experiencing meaning
comprehensively. Understanding language requires that we read meaning linearly
and nonlinearly at the same time. For instance, when we read an individual word we
not only perceive several distinct meanings in the form of letters linearly combined
together (R and E and D), but we also perceive an emergent holistic meaning in the
form of the word itself (RED). In similar fashion, when we read a sentence, we
perceive distinct meanings of individual words as they make up the sentence, as well
as the central message or meaning of the sentence as a whole.
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The linear emphasis to reading, then, focuses on the individual meanings of letters
and words that accumulate together to comprise the physical text, whereas the
nonlinear perspective focuses more on the meanings that actually emerge holistically
as a result of the relationships that exist, not only between the letters and words, but
also between the text and the individual reader. The important point to make is that
both the linear expressions of the text and the nonlinear intuitions of the reader are
required to understand the text at all. In fact, one might even say that the processes of
reading, speaking, writing and so fourth are but the delicate art of holding the tension
between the physical expressions and nonphysical impressions of the text
simultaneously.
This kind of comprehensive seeing of the unfolded whole that is already enfolded
within the parts may explain why Bortoft describes our experiences with language as
being essentially “hologrammatical.” Lewis also refers to a similar experience of
reading meaning holistically when describing his perceptions of beauty in general:
The colors and shapes in a beautiful painting are really only sensations in my
eye, produced by light waves between me and the painting. It follows then
that neither the painting, nor any other material thing can be beautiful in itself.
The beauty therefore is not in the painting at all but is something purely
spiritual, arising almost mysteriously out of the relation between the painting
and me. (Lewis, 1986, pp. 216-217)
This I believe is an extremely important point when thinking about current
curricular discourses and how to expand them into a more comprehensive context of
meaning, especially when we consider how incredibly one-sided the linear
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perspective continues to be in many modernist discourses today. The problem with
this overemphasis is that it strongly promotes a positivistic cause and effect
framework of meaning, one that tends to recognize and accept only those meanings
that can be validated linearly, that is to say logically through analysis. But discerning
the linear relationships is really only half the story. To see meaning from an
exclusive analytical context is to see it but partially.
If the ultimate goal is to expand modernist curricular discourses into a more
comprehensive framework of meaning, then I believe this should encourage seeing
meaning not merely from a linear perspective of analytical logic, but from a nonlinear
perspective of intuitive holism as well. Without the development of this nonlinear
perspective on meaning I believe we preclude a more comprehensive understanding
of the world by ignoring the intuitive, emergent and nonlinear meanings that can arise
holistically only as we interact directly as participants in the phenomena. In fact,
such a comprehensive curricular discourse would be one that approached the
phenomena of nature much in the same way that we approach language: as a text to
be read comprehensively with the “double vision” of the analytical intellect and the
synthetic imagination.
This comprehensive approach to “reading nature” like language would involve,
among other things, a conscious attempt to resist our modernist habit of always trying
to replace concrete experiences with abstract explanations. It would also resist the
even more questionable modernist educational practice of actually encouraging
students to engage in carefully “engineered concrete learning experiences” only to
later define and instruct the students as to what those experiences actually meant from
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a modernist scientific perspective. This sort of educational practice is unfortunate in
that it often portrays itself as a kind of holistic, “experience based” alternative to
more traditional modernist curricular discourses. It gives the appearance of
promoting concrete experiences with nature only to strip those experiences of their
nonlinear qualities by smuggling in a linear abstract explanation in their place. This
kind of modernist “Trojan Horse” approach to “experience based learning” is in many
ways similar to an educational practice described by Lewis in his Abolition of Man
(1974) where “in a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and expect the
function...We castrate and then bid the geldings to be fruitful” (p. 26).
Therefore, instead of allowing our concrete experiences with nature to be mitigated
or completely replaced with an abstract explanation, the curricular discourse that
incorporates a genuine nonlinear approach would actually encourage students to
allow their own concrete experiences with nature to become the explanation of the
phenomena themselves. Naydler refers to this idea when describing Goethe’s
qualitative scientific approach:
Goethe’s method is characterized by a ‘soft’ approach to nature, in which the
scientist works from an attitude of receptive ‘listening’ rather than an
overactive conjecturing combined with attempts to either prove or disprove
the conjectures. Goethe seeks instead to attune to what is experienced,
refraining as far as possible from trying to fit the experience into any
preconceived ideas or theories. (Naydler, 1996, p. 70)
This “delicate” empirical approach is one that consistently endeavors to receive the
meaning of the phenomena holistically through a direct participation with those
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phenomena instead of allowing them to be replaced with an abstract theoretical idea.
Simply stated, it is an approach where the observer endeavors:
…to sink himself in contemplation in the phenomenon than to form further
thoughts about it. It implies a certain--if one may use the word--chastity of
thought, a willingness not to go beyond a certain point. The blue of the sky,
said Goethe, is the theory. To go further and weave a web of abstract ideas
remote from anything we can perceive with our senses in order to explain this
blue is to darken counsel. (Barfield, 1966, p. 34)
This strong modernist desire to go beyond the phenomena and replace our
concrete, nonlinear experiences with an abstract, linear explanation is largely based in
another modernist desire: to dominate and control the natural environment.
Unfortunately, nonlinear meanings are not normally conducive to domination and
control of our natural world. In fact, they tend to move in the opposite direction of
most modernist techniques of domination, such as the preponderance of analytical
reasoning, the quantification of matter, and the over emphasis of a logical cause and
effect relationships. However, I do believe these nonlinear meanings can be
conducive to engendering such things as depth of meaning, a sense of
interconnectedness and belongingness, and an increased capacity for enjoyment and
aesthetic appreciation of nature. Again, such holistic meanings may do very little
toward helping us master learning objectives, increase material wealth and comfort,
or even extend our life on this planet. But I believe they can do a great deal toward
making our lives feel a little less fragmented and a bit more worth the living.
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As such, this comprehensive curricular approach to reading nature like a living
discourse would be one that utilized “the sense-perceptual aspects of nature like
letters of words, or words of a text: as signs for meaning” (as cited in Bortoft, 1996,
p. 309). The Romantic poets referred to a similar approach to reading nature
holistically as the process of deep calling unto deep. This process consisted of a
conscious attempt to allow the pervasive whole that already connected the individual
and the natural world into a unity of togetherness, to become one light of meaning in
the individual’s mind so that they could begin “hearing what the phenomena were
really saying” (Naydler, 1996, p. 71). Lewis refers to this Romantic approach to
nature as one that ultimately seeks to receive the “moods of time” and the “spirit of
the place” as opposed to replacing the phenomena with abstract explanations:
It is the “moods” or the “spirits” that matter. [Romantic] Nature lovers want
to receive as fully as possible whatever nature, at each particular time and
place, is, so to speak, saying. The obvious richness, grace, and harmony of
some scenes are no more precious to them than the grimness, bleakness,
terror, monotony, or “visionary dreariness” of others. The featureless itself
gets from them a willing response. It is one more word uttered by nature.
They lay themselves bare to the sheer quality of every countryside, every hour
of the day. They want to absorb it into themselves, to be colored through and
through by it. (Lewis, 1988, p. 18)
This linguistic approach to reading nature like a living discourse, then, would be
one far less like a logical investigation and more like a personal invitation to look,
listen, and attend to the “poetry of the earth,” that “is never dead” to those who have
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ears to hear (Keats, 1996, p. 26). It is therefore a comprehensive approach that sees
the natural world as a “language of images” to be read by the two-fold vision of the
analytical intellect and the synthetic imagination. But unlike our own aspect blind
modernist approach, this holistic curricular discourse would be one that never allowed
the intellect to logically reduce the intrinsic meanings of the natural world into a mere
sum of isolated parts; something the English poet William Wordsworth (1996)
foresaw and warned against when writing in his poem The Tables Turned (1798):
Sweet is the lore that nature brings; our meddling intellect,
We misshape the beautiful form of things; we murder to dissect
By holding the tension between the intellect and the imagination, reading nature
like a living discourse would be a curricular approach that persistently encouraged a
comprehensive perception of meaning by allowing the intellect to separate without
isolating, and the imagination to integrate without assimilating. As a result, it would
be an approach where the logically deduced theoretical meanings would never be
allowed to overshadow or completely abolish the nonlinear holistic meanings that can
only be read intuitively from the phenomena themselves.
In summary, unlike our own narrowly defined modernist curricular discourse that
is forever trying to replace the external surfaces of the appearances in order to explain
the deep meanings that are believed to cumulatively produce them, the linguistic,
nonlinear approach to reading nature as a living discourse would be one, as Scottish
poet George MacDonald (1824-1905) describes, where “the surface is the deepest
after all” (MacDonald, 1996, p. 258). That is because it is ultimately through the
surfaces, through our own concrete experiences with the outer appearances of the
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phenomena themselves, that we are afforded a privileged glimpse into the deep
enfolded meanings that can only be read in the wholeness of nature. Thus
MacDonald concludes:
All about us, in earth and air, wherever eye or ear can reach there is a power
ever breathing itself forth: now in a daisy, now in a wind-waft, a cloud, a
sunset; a power that holds constant and sweetest relation with the dark and
silent world within us…inside the spirit; outside the word. And the two are
ever trying to meet within us; and when they do meet, then the sign without,
and the longing within become one light, and the man no more walketh in
darkness, but knoweth whither he goeth. (MacDonald, 1998, pp. 415-416)
Conclusion
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to identify some of the ways that a
modernist curricular approach may act as a discourse for separating us from our
world today and to recommend possible conceptual directions for expanding that
discourse into a more comprehensive framework of meaning for the future. Three
broad curricular approaches were recommended for helping us to expand modernist
curricular discourses.
The first involved an approach to the curriculum that would encourage a
paradoxical context for embracing more meaning as opposed to merely alternating
between meanings. This involved an approach that encouraged the simultaneous
holding of the tensions between the analytical intellect that divides and separates and
the synthetic imagination that organizes and integrates. It was also suggested that this
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paradoxical approach to meaning might result in a greater ability to see the natural
world more comprehensively, as opposed to just seeing it differently.
The second recommendation for expanding modernist curricular discourses
involved a discussion of the concept of autopoietic growth and the importance of
developing a historical consciousness in general. It was suggested that by developing
a historical awareness in our future curricular discourses we can begin enhancing our
ability to see the contingency of our knowledge and beliefs about the world. Such
information, it was suggested, could help us not only “stray afield” of ourselves
conceptually speaking, but it could also help us in transforming our current
understanding of the world by recasting it into a broader context of togetherness with
the past.
Finally, this chapter recommended a holistic curricular approach to understanding
our world from a linguistic point of view. This suggested that there are certain
intrinsic meanings and relationships that can only be discerned and “read” from
nature holistically as we participate with the phenomena. Approaching the natural
world from a “hologramatical” conceptual outlook could be one approach for helping
us to expand modernist curricular discourses into a more comprehensive framework
of meaning. By learning to “read nature” holistically like a living discourse, we can
begin apprehending not only the physical surface of the phenomenal world, but its
intuitive and psychical depth as well.
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